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ABSTRACT 
 
Joshua M. Jansa: Laboratories of Inequality 
(Under the direction of Virginia Gray and Thomas Carsey) 
 
 
  This dissertation addresses critical limitations in the theory of economic competition 
between the American states.  In doing so, it looks at the growing use of economic development 
incentives (or subsidies) by states. Specifically, extant theory is limited in its ability to predict 
differences across the states in incentive spending and oversight, and is limited in its assessment 
of the effect of incentives.  Instead of pure competition between neighboring states, incentives 
are actually the product of a political process in which individual firms and business associations 
work closely with economic development bureaucrats and state legislators to develop policy.  
Meanwhile, other organizations struggle to gain access. The consequences of this process are 
that states increase their use of incentives in order to keep up competition for investment from 
desired industries. State officials also risk increasing economic inequality with their use of 
incentives.  Despite lawmakers’ intention to create broad economic prosperity, economic 
development policy can merely reinforce existing political and economic advantages because of 
the policy process in which it is formulated.  From the dissertation, scholars and practitioners can 
learn how to institute a more representative political processes and create more effective policy. 
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INTRODUCTION: STATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
DISTRIBUTING PUBLIC FUNDS TO PRIVATE FIRMS 
 
In August 2015, Governor Scott Walker (R-WI) signed a bill raising $250 million in new 
taxes to fund the construction of a basketball arena in downtown Milwaukee. The arena would be 
the state-of-the-art home for the Milwaukee Bucks, whose leadership had threatened to leave the 
state for a new arena elsewhere. Walker spearheaded the “Cheaper to Keep Them” campaign to 
raise state funding for the arena, arguing that the loss of the Bucks would be worse for 
employment and growth than higher taxes or cuts to other programs.1 Milwaukee Bucks 
President Peter Feigin summarized the public interest in the effort, saying, “This is much more 
than an arena. This is about economic development, and this is about thousands of people living, 
working, and playing in downtown Milwaukee” (Calamur 2015). 
The Wisconsin example is typical across the United States. State governments compete to 
attract and retain investment from private firms and they use economic development incentives, 
or subsidies, to do so. Economic development incentives are fiscal policies that reduce costs to 
businesses in order to encourage investment and job growth in a particular location. Incentives 
are awarded to specific firms in a variety of industries and include such cost-reducing measures 
as property, sales, and income tax credits, tax abatement, cash grants, cost reimbursement, and 
infrastructure assistance.  Economic development incentives have reached such prevalence 
among the states that the Pew Center on the States called incentives “the leading tool used by 
states to grow their economies” (Pew Center 2012).  Collectively, the states spend billions every 
																																								 																				
1 In the same year, Walker led the fight over for a state budget that cut $250 million in funding for the University of 
Wisconsin system (Strauss 2015). 
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year in economic development incentives.  It is not overstated to say that economic development 
ranks alongside education as a premier function of state government (see Peterson 1995). 
Scholars have found that this critical area of state policy is the product of fierce economic 
competition among the states. Many have observed that the use of incentives to attract private 
investment constitutes a “second war between the states” (see Hanson 1993). States are 
compelled to offer incentives to private firms; not doing so risks losing current or potential 
investment to other states (Peterson 1995; Berry and Berry 1990; Baybeck, Berry, and Siegel 
2011). As a result, states engage in an arms race in hopes of outmatching one another’s 
generosity to capital (Peterson 1995). The goal is to use incentives to both secure investment and 
signal that the state is a good place for doing business (Milward and Newman 1983; Eisinger 
1988).2 In a recent debate on incentives in the North Carolina legislature, Democratic State 
Representative Elmer Floyd summarized the interstate competition orientation, saying “If you're 
going to run with the big dogs, what you got to do?” (Leslie 2015 b). The answer, Republican 
House Speaker Tim Moore replied, was to offer more incentives (Leslie 2015 b). 
Economic competition as an explanation of state-level incentive policy has three main 
tenets. First, competitive pressure creates the conditions in which states innovate in their use of 
incentives, and those innovations diffuse across the states (Eisinger 1988; 1995; see also Berry 
and Berry 1990). Empirically, therefore, a large portion of the states should provide relatively 
equal benefits to firms as they match each other’s efforts. Second, states primarily compete with 
their geographic neighbors since proximal states are the most likely destination for capital flight 
(Saiz 2001; see also Baybeck, Berry, and Siegel 2011). Thus, the probability of adopting an 
																																								 																				
2 Incentives aren’t the only policy that states use to create a business friendly climate.  Keeping taxes and wages low 
through the corporate income tax rate, minimum and prevailing wage, and right to work laws are also used (e.g., 
Witko and Newmark 2005). These other policies are discussed throughout the dissertation and their effect on the 
economy is tested in Chapter 3.  
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incentive program increases as a state’s geographic neighbors adopt similar incentive programs. 
Third, interstate competition is both the cause of and rationale for using incentives. Scholars 
have found weak evidence that incentives actually create jobs or growth (e.g., Brace 1993; 
Dewar 2001). Yet, elected officials use them to keep up with competition and signal to the 
electorate that they are actively attempting to create jobs (e.g., Sharp and Elkins 1991). 
Limitations of the Interstate Competition Paradigm  
Each of these tenets is limited by the underspecified role of bureaucratic institutions and 
interest groups in shaping state policy. Specifically, the economic development agencies that are 
charged with administering incentives and the firms and business associations that benefit from 
incentives form powerful policy subsystems that shape the funding of incentives, the use of 
incentives, and the effect of incentives. 
First, the extant literature is limited in its ability to predict persistent and disproportionate 
differences in incentive spending across the states. Indeed, incentive spending is concentrated in 
a few states and benefits a few, relatively wealthy firms (Hanson 1993; Jansa and Gray 
forthcoming; see also Witko and Newmark 2005). These findings call into question the 
applicability of the universal arms race as an explanation. Instead, as policy diffusion expert 
Karch (2007) argues, it is likely that stakeholders within states shape the content of policy. In 
economic development, those stakeholders are the economic development agencies and business 
sector, each of which has a financial stake in incentives.  These institutions and interest groups 
encourage more spending and less oversight in order to remain competitive for investment. 
The geographic operationalization of the interstate competition hypothesis also does not 
reflect the influence of agencies and interest groups. States shape their incentive efforts to reflect 
input from agencies and firms on how best to attract desired and mobile industries in a globalized 
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economy. While scholars have recognized this limitation (e.g., Shipan and Volden 2012), no 
alternative operationalization exists for economic competition as a mechanism of state policy 
adoptions.  
Finally, failure to recognize the crucial role of groups and agencies leads scholars to 
focus on the wrong economic indicators when evaluating incentives. Incentives are formulated 
with the close consultation of businesses and agencies that focus incentives on attracting and 
retaining the firms that bring the most prestige and capital investment. In response to this input, 
states distribute public resources disproportionately to the wealthiest firms. Although intended to 
achieve job creation and economic growth, aiding the wealthiest firms can also affect the level of 
economic inequality in the state. 
A New Approach to Economic Development 
To address these limitations, it is argued here that incentives are shaped by a policy 
process in which client groups work closely with state economic development officials and 
legislators to define economic development goals and develop the tools to meet these goals. 
Competing groups with countervailing views struggle to gain access. As a result, states 
dominated by client groups spend more on incentives with less oversight. Consistent with client 
group dominance, states award more incentives when states that target the same industries award 
more incentives.  As a result, income inequality is exacerbated by concentrating benefits with the 
wealthiest firms without reciprocal job and wage growth for those in need.  
The first chapter examines the process behind the formulation and negotiation of 
incentives. Borrowing from the capture literature, which finds that policies that take broad funds 
and concentrate them among a few recipients—like incentives do—are at high risk of being 
dominated by client groups, I argue that pro-incentive input from client groups is amplified when 
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institutional barriers prevent competing groups from participation. When policymaking is 
dominated by client groups, scholars should expect rapid growth in incentive spending but 
stagnate oversight. To the degree that competing groups are able to build majorities in the 
traditional legislative process, states will more cautiously increase spending and engage in more 
oversight. To test this theory, I conduct interview-based case studies of incentive policy in three 
states—Oregon, Nevada, and North Carolina. I find support for the theory; North Carolina and 
Oregon had relatively more input from competing groups and worked to restrain failed incentive 
programs. Nevada, on the other hand, was dominated by client groups and greatly expanded its 
incentive regime amid little legislative oversight. 
The second chapter is an examination of the adoption of large incentive packages by 
states over a thirty-year period. Building on the findings of Chapter 1, state governments are 
likely to compete for specific industries in pursuit of a larger development strategy formulated 
with the help of client groups and economic development agencies. It is hypothesized that states 
are more likely to award incentive packages based on competition for targeted industries rather 
than competition between geographic neighbors. A repeated event history analysis is used to 
analyze the frequency of incentive package adoption and support for the industry-based 
competition hypothesis is found. States experiencing high levels of competition for targeted 
industries more frequently award incentive packages, all else equal.  
The final chapter is an analysis of the effect of incentives on income inequality. States 
implement policies that make their markets more amenable to business investment in an effort to 
create growth.  But this also creates conditions for increased income inequality. Specifically, 
inequality increases because incentives predominately serve to support the bottom line of the 
wealthiest firms, encouraging them to engage in rent-seeking and creating uncertainty for wage 
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dependent workers. Support for the hypothesis is found; states with higher incentive spending 
generate higher inequality for many years into the future. 
Key Terms Used Throughout the Dissertation 
I use several key terms throughout the dissertation, which are defined below as a guide 
for the reader. Other terms that are important to particular chapters (such as capture, client 
politics, industry-targeting, and market conditioning) are defined in the chapter they are 
discussed. 
• Economic development incentives: Defined above. Also referred to as subsidies. This 
term is defined in each chapter as a reminder. 
• Incentive program: A program implemented by the state legislature that takes public 
funds and distributes them to qualified businesses for the purpose of creating jobs and 
economic growth.  Programs can be either statutory (defining how firms can qualify and 
for how much by formula) or discretionary (letting economic development agencies and 
the governor determine how much to award to which firms).    
• Incentive package: A specialized set of awards provided to a specific firm in order to 
reduce its cost of doing business in a particular location.  Packages are commonly 
negotiated and can bundle several different incentives, such as sales, property, or income 
tax breaks, infrastructure assistance, cash grants or bond funding, or waivers for 
compliance with particular regulations. 
• Client groups: Interest groups that have a financial stake in a particular policy. In the 
realm of economic development incentives, these are individual firms seeking incentives 
and their industry associations.  The firms tend to be large, wealthy firms and in chapter 3 
I refer explicitly to these wealthy firms as the primary beneficiaries of incentive 
spending.  Small businesses are not included in this definition because they rarely lobby 
on their own and, as background interviews show, are not included in strategic economic 
development planning.  
• Competing groups: Interest groups with opposing points of view vis-à-vis client groups.  
In the realm of economic development incentives, competing groups include diverse 
groups on the left and the right.  Such groups are labor unions, tax-payer and libertarian 
groups, progressive groups, community organizations, and education institutions.  Each 
of these types of groups is either philosophically against the use of incentives by 
governments, or seeks reforms to address concerns that incentives are too secretive and 
generous to big businesses to be effective policy tools.  These groups seek greater access 
than they are given. 
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Contributions to Scholarship and Practice 
Taking an interest groups and institutions approach to interstate competition helps move 
the literature toward a more complete understanding of how and why states compete. Interstate 
competition is a natural inclination of state governments, but highly encouraged by those with a 
financial stake in the maintenance and acceleration of incentives—wealthy firms receiving the 
benefits and the economic development agencies buoyed by incentive funds.  State legislators 
rely on their input when making policy decisions.  Thus, response to competition is conditioned 
on the influence of these institutions and interest groups in each state.  By taking this approach, 
several key questions are answered on the political economy of the American states. 
Practically, despite lawmakers’ intention to create broad economic prosperity, economic 
development incentives can merely reinforce existing advantages because of the policy process 
in which it is formulated; inequality of access can lead to the unequal distribution of resources. 
States run the risk using public resources to concentrate income with top earners in a time of 
already high inequality and strained budgets.  The key point is this: the representativeness of the 
incentive policy process matters for the the characteristics and effect of incentives. Economic 
development practitioners will struggle to secure their goal of economic prosperity for the many 
without including the many in policy formulation.  
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CHAPTER 1: INSTITUTIONS, INTEREST GROUPS, AND THE CAPTURE OF STATE 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
 
Why do states differ in their use and oversight of economic development incentives? 
Scholars have repeatedly identified interstate competition as the predominant explanation for the 
adoption of incentive programs and packages (Grady 1987; Jenn and Nourzad 1996; Saiz 2001).  
Some studies argue that such competition is an inherent motivation of state governments (e.g., 
Peterson 1995), while others argue that competition is encouraged by firms seeking incentives 
(e.g., Harrison and Kanter 1978). It is unclear, however, how well either of these versions of the 
interstate competition hypothesis explains differences among the states in incentive policy 
(Hanson 1993; Witko and Newmark 2005; Jansa and Gray forthcoming). Such blunt hypotheses 
obscure the impact of the policy process on incentives and makes it difficult for researchers and 
practitioners to understand why state-level policy differences exist and whether these differences 
are governed by interstate competition alone. As policy diffusion scholar Karch (2007) notes, it 
is likely that differences in policy content exists due to the unique institutional arrangements and 
political environments in each state. 
This paper provides a theory of based on client politics and capture to explain why states 
respond differently to interstate competition for investment. Specifically, incentives are at risk of 
capture by client groups when their input is not balanced by competing groups. Client groups—
firms seeking incentives and business associations—encourage the use of incentives and take 
advantage of formal and informal barriers that preclude input from competing groups. Presented 
with unbalanced input and holding a pro-business mission bias, economic development agencies 
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decline to verify firm-provided information, fail to analyze the secondary consequences of 
subsidization, and echo client group arguments for incentives in the legislature. Competing 
groups, however, can work-around captured agencies by finding support among legislators 
during the program formulation phase. When this happens, states are slower to expand incentive 
spending and more likely to review and repeal ineffective programs. 
In-depth case studies of three states—Oregon, Nevada, and North Carolina—are used to 
test the theory. Data is gathered from original interviews and archival research and demonstrates 
support for the theory. Oregon and North Carolina exhibited slow growth in incentive spending 
and regular legislative oversight in response to input from ideological interest groups.  Nevada, 
whose lobbying community is dominated by client business groups, rapidly accelerated incentive 
spending over the time period studied and did not provide much oversight. The results show that 
response to interstate competition is conditioned on the diversity of interest group input by state-
level institutions. 
 This research holds important implications for scholarly theories of economic 
development, as well as the practice of economic development. Theoretically, interstate 
competition is muddled by whether or not it is fueled by firms seeking incentives and its lack of 
explanatory power for persistent differences across the states. This paper develops a theory of 
how state institutions and their rules and norms serve to prioritize input from firms seeking 
incentives, compelling and reinforcing responsiveness to interstate competition. The ability of 
client groups to leverage competition into greater incentive spending and less oversight depends, 
though, on how much other groups are barred from participation. By clarifying the causal 
mechanism, this paper provides practical insights into possible reforms. Public comment periods, 
professional devil’s advocates, and E-bay-like open-bidding processes can be effective ways of 
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diversifying interest group input and reducing the risk of capture. In this way, practitioners may 
more effectively pursue the public interest of creating jobs and protecting taxpayers. 
Interstate Competition & Economic Development Incentives 
Interstate competition is the dominant explanation in the literature for the adoption of 
incentive programs and packages.  According to this perspective, state governments must 
implement policies designed to attract investment, or risk losing resources to other jurisdictions 
(Peterson 1995; Berry and Berry 1990; Baybeck, Berry, and Siegel 2011). States, as a result, 
engage in an arms race, offering new and more generous policies to attract capital (Grady 1987; 
Peterson 1995) and stagnating on labor-friendly policies (Hansen 2001; Jenkins, Leicht, and 
Wendt 2006). 
Some scholars argue that interstate competition is inherent; subsidization is the preferred 
policy choice for legislators in democratic capitalist (Lindblom 1977) and federal (Peterson 
1995) systems. Game theoretic studies have modeled interstate competition as a prisoner’s 
dilemma, where the dominant strategy is to subsidize private industry (Thomas 1997; Rogers and 
Ellis 2000; Rodrik and van Ypersele 2001). Elected officials also award incentives in pursuit of 
re-election goals (Sharp and Elkins 1991; Turner 2003) and to satisfy voter demands for 
economic growth (Lindblom 1977). Firms benefit because mobility and liquidity conveys 
structural power (Lindblom 1977, 1980). 
Scholars have tested inherent competition as a theory of incentives, finding support in the 
tendency of states to adopt incentive innovations when other states have adopted them (Grady 
1987; Eisinger 1995; Jenn and Nourzad 1996; Saiz 2001). States take cues from the perceived 
economic development successes of other states and mimic their policies (Eisinger 1995). This is 
true even if the incentive programs show little evidence of stimulating economic growth (Grady 
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1987). The positive relationship between competition and policy adoption holds when tested 
alongside alternative hypotheses; scholars find little support for interest group strength (Jenn and 
Nourzad 1996), government ideology (Saiz 2001), or fiscal stress (Saiz 2001) having 
independent effects on incentive policy adoptions. These findings have placed inherent 
competition as the dominate theory in the literature.3 
Scholars have also argued that interstate competition is encouraged, or that firms exercise 
their power to increase incentive awards (e.g., Wolman and Spitzely 1996). Hirschman (1970) 
provides the logic that exiting, or threatening exit, can increase the probability that governments 
adopt favorable policies.4  Firms, therefore, make threats to locate elsewhere in order to reap 
more subsidies (Hanson 1993; Coyne and Moberg 2014). Looking historically, Bluestone and 
Harrison (1982) argue that manufacturers strategically leveraged globalization to extract 
resources from governments. Similarly, Shermer (2013) finds that business leaders pursued close 
working relationships with Sun Belt state officials in order to implement low-wage, low-tax, and 
high-incentive policy regimes. Quantitative studies that find that business groups outnumber 
other organizations in economic development policymaking (Gray and Lowery 1991) and that 
their campaign contributions are used to secure more incentives (Jansa and Gray forthcoming). 
Indeed, Harrison and Kanter (1978) even contend that domination by the business sector is the 
impetus behind state-level incentives.   
Both perspectives on competition, however, fail to explain why persistent differences in 
incentive policy exist among the states. Though they propose different mechanisms, each 
																																								 																				
3 Indeed, a book chapter on the topic in a leading state politics primer notes that globalization and jurisdictional 
competition are the primary explanations for differences in state economic development policy (Saiz and Clarke 
2013). 
 
4 Hirschman (1970) builds on Tiebout’s (1956) famous locational model, which demonstrated that rational actors are 
likely to locate in the jurisdiction that provides the highest utility. 
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perspective should predict a steady and relatively equal acceleration of subsidization to the point 
of equilibrium. Empirically, however, scholars note persistent state-level differences in 
smokestack chasing (Hanson 1993), pro-business tax and labor policies (Witko and Newmark 
2005) and incentive spending (Jansa and Gray forthcoming) that is not predicted by either 
mechanism. Incentives are surprisingly highly concentrated, with relatively few states accounting 
for most of the spending and relatively few firms accumulating most of the benefits (Jansa and 
Gray forthcoming). The South and Rust Belt, in particular, have been at the forefront of 
economic development innovation (Cobb 1993) and have far outspent other regions (Jansa and 
Gray forthcoming). The skewed distribution is evidence that states are not responding to 
interstate pressure alone, however conceptualized.  
There are two clear limitations in the literature that need to be addressed. The first is the 
specification of a causal mechanism that accounts for persistent and large differences across the 
states in incentive policy.  The second is sorting out whether business influence is important to 
understanding responses to interstate competition or not. The literature on regulatory capture and 
client politics can be used to address these limitations. In particular, the capture literature finds 
that the diversity of interest group input in government institutions is a key determinant of the 
characteristics of policies that provide concentrated benefits to client groups.   
Policies that Concentrate Benefits & Their Risk of Capture 
Many policies take broad public funds and concentrate them among one or few recipient 
organizations. These policies, like any policy, attempt to accomplish some public interest.  Yet, 
these policies are at risk of being captured by recipient organizations—or client groups—because 
the concentrated benefits provide the resources and motivation for client groups to maintain and 
increase such funding even if it fails to achieve the public interest (Lowi 1972; Wilson 1973).  
  
 13 
Economic development incentives are a perfect example of this kind of policy; states award 
public funds to private firms in order to create jobs and economic growth.   
The politics of these policies are typically characterized by client politics, where the 
client groups have premier access to relevant legislators and bureaucrats and use their access to 
maintain their benefits (Wilson 1973; see also Lowi 1972). These three political actors work 
together to formulate policy in an insular and iterative process.  Wilson (1973, 1989) finds that, 
because of the insular process, policy is typically characterized by high responsiveness to client 
group demands.  This responsiveness can rise to the level of capture; A government entity is 
captured when it is influenced by an interest group or sector of interest groups to the extent that 
the group(s) effectively directs government decision making.5 When captured, policy 
systematically reflects the capturing group’s preferences rather than the public interest 
(Carpenter 2004; 2014).6  
A fairly consistent finding in the literature, however, is that the risk of capture can be 
reduced by balancing client group input with input from diverse and competing interest groups 
(Berry 1984; Gormley 1982; Rourke 1991; Sabatier 1975; Schwarcz 2014).7 Absent 
countervailing pressure from competing interest groups, policy that concentrates benefits among 
																																								 																				
5 While early scholars of capture focused on the influence of individual firms or industries on regulatory policy 
made by bureaucracies (Bernstein 1955; Huntington 1952; Stigler 1971), more recent scholarship has examined 
interest groups’ ability to capture bureaucracies and legislatures in distributive policy (Wilson 1989; Posner 2014). 
 
6 Capture can occur strictly or culturally. Strict capture occurs when an interest group provides resources, such as 
bribes, favors, or funding, to government decision makers in exchange for favorable policies (e.g., Huntington 
1952).  I do not think that this is the manner in which state economic development incentive policy is influenced. 
Cultural capture, on the other hand, occurs when an interest group, in pursuit of policy goals, engages in focused 
lobbying and takes advantage of institutional deficiencies to deliberately shape the assumptions and worldviews of 
government decision makers (Carpenter 2014; Kwak 2014; Johnson and Kwak 2010).  This is closer to what is 
occurring in the American states and will be discussed later in the chapter. 
 
7 Interest groups can certainly use tactics that increase their influence in the legislature and bureaucracy without 
rising to the level of capture.  For example, a legislature or bureaucracy may provide benefits to an interest group 
because their preferences happen to align with the public interest (Carpenter 2004). 
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few recipients is likelier than other policy formulations to be highly influenced by client groups.  
Indeed, scholars have found that client group influence is compounded by barriers to 
participation for competing groups (Wilson 1989; Carpenter 2014) and conflicts of interest in 
agency missions that leads to the prioritization of client group input (Huntington 1952). These 
factors create and reinforce a shared worldview among bureaucrats, legislators, and client groups 
(Kwak and Johnson 2010; Kwak 2014).8  
Applying Capture to Incentives  
The above literature helps bring clarity to the question at hand: why do states differ in 
incentive policy? The answer is that state responsiveness to interstate competition is conditioned 
on the diversity of interest group input in the policymaking process. Business encouragement of 
interstate competition is amplified by pro-business institutional arrangements but tempered by 
counterarguments provided by competing interest groups.9  
On incentives, client groups are individual firms and business associations that actively 
provide pro-incentive information to legislators and bureaucrats. Competing groups are other 
organizations in the interest group community, on the left and right, that are either ideologically 
opposed to incentives or accept incentives but worry about giving away too many public 
resources. Despite diversity of preferences in the interest group community, not all preferences 
are given equal weight. Instead, institutional rules or practices can limit the consideration of 
																																								 																				
8 Capture is similar to the iron triangle model in terms of the relevant actors—bureaucrats, select legislators, vested 
interest groups—but the theoretical approaches hold different assumptions about whether the preferences of the 
government officials are fixed or malleable. The iron triangle model assumes that preferences are fixed and the 
actors within the iron triangle bargain over policy (and exclude others from the bargaining process).  Cultural 
capture, on the other hand, focuses on how the preferences of the government officials are shaped by their 
relationship with the vested interest groups.   
 
9 This assertion supposes the existence of both client and competing groups with distinct preferences on incentive 
policy. This is a testable assertion, which I evaluate in the discussion of case-study evidence below.   
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arguments and information provided by competing groups. Additionally, the accomplishment of 
a policymaking institution’s mission can be dependent on serving the client groups.  Through 
both of these mechanisms, client groups and their demands are likely to be weighted heavily 
compared to competing groups. 
At the state-level, there is both an incentive negotiation process carried out by economic 
development agencies and an incentive package approval and program formulation process led 
by the legislature.  Formal barriers and conflicts of interest exist in the incentive negotiation and 
package approval process. The program formulation process is open to competing groups, but 
they still encounter informal barriers. Formal barriers include actual facets of the institutional 
process that prevent organizations from being at the table, such as speedy approval of secretly 
negotiated packages and the use of non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) to preclude public 
exposure of proprietary information. Informal barriers are inherent biases that can be used 
against groups, such being perceived as not having 1) a financial stake in the content of policy 
and 2) expertise on incentives. 
Amplifying the voice of client groups further is the conflict of interest facing economic 
development officials. The bureaucratic mission to administer incentives in a manner that creates 
economic growth can only be accomplished by doing what is necessary to secure business 
investment. Thus, workers in these agencies tend to be especially reactive to relocation threats 
and opportunities to secure new investments, even lobbying the legislature for more incentive 
tools. Charged with negotiating incentive packages, these agencies are able to influence how 
much is spent on incentives through discretionary funds, or by negotiating packages that lie 
outside existing statute.  Immense spending power resides in agencies that are at risk of capture. 
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Competing groups, however, may be able to challenge client groups in the traditional 
legislative process during incentive formulation. With allied lawmakers, competing groups can 
make important amendments and push for greater oversight of incentive programs. In doing so, 
competing groups must seize upon examples of incentive failures in order to discredit the status 
quo, “controversialize” incentives, and create the political conditions for change in the 
legislature. Yet, even campaigns to constrain incentives through the legislative process may 
encounter informal barriers such that they are unable to slow spending or increase oversight.   
In sum, how well client and competing groups are able to access the institutions charged 
with negotiating and formulating incentives matters for incentive spending and oversight. Client 
group preferences for higher-spending and less-oversight are prioritized through mission-biased 
agencies designed to efficiently gather and process business-provided information. Competing 
groups are able to slow spending and increase oversight only if they are able to build majorities 
in the legislature. These hypotheses are stated below. A full diagram of the interaction of interest 
groups and institutions involved in the process is provided in Appendix A. 
• Hypothesis 1: Incentive spending grows faster in states where competing interest groups 
struggle to access the incentive negotiation and formulation process. 
 
• Hypothesis 2: Incentive oversight is greater in states where competing interest groups 
are able to build supportive majorities in the formulation process.  
 
Research Design & Case Selection 
To test my hypotheses, I conducted interview-based case studies of incentive packages 
and programs in Nevada, North Carolina, and Oregon. The time period 2012-2015 is examined 
for each state. These states were chosen via the most different systems approach to case selection 
(Przeworski and Teune 1970). Each of the states is active in awarding incentives large and small. 
The states differ on a number of confounding variables, including party control of legislature and 
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governorship, unemployment rate, union membership, agency type, geographic neighbors’ 
incentive effort, and whether the large packages have gone to in-state or out-of-state firms.  Each 
of these factors, or variations of them, have been purported to predict incentive effort in past 
studies (e.g., Saiz 2001). By selecting states that differ substantially on each of these factors, I 
can effectively control for them and instead examine the systematic similarities in the policy 
process across the three cases as an explanation for incentive effort. Appendix B provides a 
summary table of the economic and political conditions of each state since 2012. Below, I 
provide a brief overview of each case.  
Nevada Overview 
In January 2012, Republican Governor Brian Sandoval announced plans to establish the 
Governor’s Office of Economic Development (GOED). GOED was charged with attracting and 
expanding private investment using incentives (Domanick 2015). By mid-2012, GOED had 
negotiated its first large incentive package: $89 million in property tax breaks to Apple to help 
pay for a new data center in the Reno-Sparks area. In October 2013, representatives from the 
Tesla Motors approached GOED with interest in locating a new lithium-ion battery factory in the 
state. GOED quickly offered a $1.3 billion incentive package and partnered with land developers 
outside of Reno to begin grading the land for construction (Hidalgo 2014). On September 4th, 
2014, Tesla and GOED publicly announced the deal to locate the factory outside Reno, pending 
legislative approval of the incentive package. On September 11th, the Democratic-controlled 
legislature voted unanimously to approve the incentive package, eliminating other incentive 
programs to help pay for the package (Hagar 2014). In January 2015, Nevada subsidized the tech 
company Switch for their plans to create a fiber-optic cable loop between San Francisco and Los 
Angeles via Las Vegas and Reno (Roerink 2015). 
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North Carolina Overview 
From 2012-2015, North Carolina successfully recruited several companies to Charlotte 
and the Research Triangle, including headquarters for MetLife, HCL Technologies, and 
bubblewrap manufacturer Sealed Air Corporation (Ohnesorge 2014; Tita 2014). North Carolina 
failed to secure several large investments, including the Boeing 777x manufacturing facility, 
Toyota USA headquarters, Mercedes-Benz USA headquarters, Giti Tire factory, Keer Group 
textile factory, and production facilities for automakers Volvo and Land Rover (Dalesio 2014; 
Rothacker and Portillo 2014; Dukes 2015 a; Dukes 2015 b). Republican Governor Pat McCrory 
and the Commerce Department claimed the reason for the failed recruitments was the lack of a 
discretionary “closing fund” and an underfunded Job Development Investment Grants (JDIG) 
program (Campbell 2015). The Republican legislature tightened film incentives in 2013 and 
rejected the governor’s expansion plan in 2014. These moves replaced the film tax incentives 
with a smaller grant program and rejected the creation of a $20 million discretionary fund.  The 
legislature, however, fully funded and expanded JDIG and created a discretionary fund at the end 
of the 2015 session (Leslie 2015).  
Oregon Overview 
In October 2012, Democratic Governor John Kitzhaber was approached by Nike with a 
request for a 30-year extension on a corporate income tax break to help support their “Project 
Insight”.10  The extension exempted all income made on sales outside of Oregon from the state’s 
corporate income tax, a savings to Nike of $2 billion over the 30-year period (Gaston 2012). 
After months of negotiation, Kitzhaber called the legislature into a special session on December 
																																								 																				
10 Specifically, Nike sought “single-sales tax apportionment” which means that the state’s corporate income tax rate 
would only apply to income made from in-state sales. Single-sales tax apportionment is increasingly an incentive 
policy used by states to attract investment. For more in-depth information on the use of the single-sales tax factor as 
an economic development incentive, see the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (2012) and Mazerov (2005). 
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10th, 2012, to get the incentive deal approved. The legislature held hearings on December 13th, 
and amended and passed the bill December 14th. In 2013, Intel sought the same 30-year 
guarantee, which they were awarded outright under the Nike law. The next year, Intel also 
sought to renegotiate their Strategic Investment Program (SIP) subsidy package with Washington 
County and the City of Hillsboro. SIP is a joint state and local program in which local 
governments are partially refunded for the deals they negotiate with firms. The localities 
approved a new agreement worth $2 billion in property tax relief over 30-years (Hammill 2014). 
Case Study Methodology 
Data was gathered from interviews with individuals involved in incentive policy in each 
state. Data was also gathered from newspaper accounts of incentive policy in each state over the 
three-year period. Both types of data are used to evaluate the hypotheses.  
For the journalistic evidence, I searched for articles published from 2012-2015 pertaining 
to economic development incentives in the archives of the leading newspapers and online capitol 
blotters in each state.11  These sources are The Oregonian (Portland), OregonLive, the Raleigh 
News and Observer, the Charlotte Observer, WRAL.com @NCCapitol, the Las Vegas Sun 
News, and the Reno Gazette-Journal. National news sources such as the Wall Street Journal, 
New York Times, and Washington Post were consulted when appropriate.  
A list of potential interviewees was produced from those individuals quoted or referenced 
in journalistic accounts of incentives in each state.  These individuals were coded into one of the 
four occupational categories: client group (business) lobbyists, state legislators, economic 
development officials, and competing group lobbyists. Interview subjects were contacted via 
																																								 																				
11 I also used relevant company names (e.g., Nike) as search terms to be able to focus on the big events that 
happened in each state over the time period. 
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email with an explanation of the project and a request for an in-person interview. When an in-
person interview was not possible, a phone interview was requested.  The interviews were semi-
structured and designed to extract information on the actual behaviors of subjects on the relevant 
incentive package or program (see Leech et al 2013; Beckmann and Hall 2013). For example, 
each subject was asked about his or her role—who they contacted, how often, what arguments 
were made, and any other tactics used—now and in past specific incentive debates. At the end of 
the interview, each subject was asked if any other individuals should be interviewed. This 
created a snowball sample to ensure maximum coverage of the relevant actors. I continued 
interviews until no new information was learned with each interview.12 
A total of 33 people were interviewed for the study.  By state, 10 individuals were 
interviewed in Nevada, 9 in North Carolina, and 15 in Oregon. By occupation, I interviewed 5 
competing group lobbyists, 5 business lobbyists, 11 legislators, and 12 economic development 
officials. Economic development officials and legislators were purposely oversampled in order to 
provide an in-depth understanding of decision-makers and their institutions. 29 of the 33 
interviews were conducted in person, 4 by phone. 24 individuals were sampled purposively and 9 
were sampled via snowball.  
Overall, the response rate on interview requests was 47.9%. By state, the response rate 
was 56.5% in Oregon, 52.9% in North Carolina, and 34.4% in Nevada. The majority of 
interviews were conducted from May 2015 to July 2015, with the exception of two conducted in 
February 2015 and April 2015, respectively. Records of the interviews were made by taking 
hand written notes on a pre-printed questionnaire sheet. Subjects were informed that they would 
not be identified by name or specific identifiers, although they would be identified by occupation 
																																								 																				
12 At this point, the interview process is deemed “saturated” and it is recommended that interviews cease in order to 
not exhaust the population being studied of this project or future projects. 
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and state. A script of interview questions is provided in Appendix C. A summary of the interview 
sample, including length and date of interview, is provided in Appendix D.  
The discussion of the case-study evidence will proceed as follows.  First, the evidence 
will be discussed with regards to some of the important assumptions of the theory. These 
assumptions are 1) there is diversity in opinions, information, and expertise in the interest group 
community on incentive policy and 2) there are formal and informal barriers that prevent diverse 
opinions, information, and expertise from being considered in the incentive package negotiation 
and approval process.  I then turn to testing my hypotheses on the effects of this process on 
spending and oversight. The evidence provides support for the assumptions and confirms the 
hypotheses.  The confirmation of the hypotheses brings leverage to the question of whether 
Nevada, North Carolina, and Oregon have captured processes; I conclude with a discussion of 
this question. 
Inside the Incentive Debate 
 It was evident through interview and journalistic evidence that there is a wide array of 
preferences in the interest group community. The evidence also demonstrated remarkable 
consistency in arguments for and against incentives across the three states. As such, I will 
discuss evidence from all three states together for this section of the analysis. Each subject, 
regardless of occupation, was asked to provide pros and cons of incentives, as well as to 
characterize their own position on incentives.  Most legislators and nearly all economic 
development officials and business lobbyists were pro-incentives or advocated for incentives in 
newspaper accounts of incentive policy debates.  Some competing group lobbyists and a few 
legislators were opposed to the use of incentives outright, while most would like to see major 
changes in incentive policy but not their elimination. Business lobbyists used several primary 
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arguments to support the creation, expansion, and maintenance of incentive programs.  No 
evidence was found of business lobbyists actively working against incentives, although many 
recognized some of the downsides of incentives touted by competing groups.   
Generally, pro-incentive arguments highlighted the mutual benefits of incentives for 
states and businesses.  For states, incentives can provide a return on investment with relatively 
low-risk and cost. There is often no outlay of state funds since incentives usually consist of tax 
abatements on currently non-existent property or income. When direct payments are made, the 
state is likely to recoup costs because of increased tax revenue from the incomes of individuals 
and businesses constructing the property, or individuals and businesses providing services to the 
subsidized firm and its employees. 
 Proponents also argue that incentives help the state direct development, rather than 
leaving the structure of the economy to the whims of the market.  Incentives can push investment 
to needy locations, attract industries that complement existing strengths, pursue investments in 
clean, sustainable, growing, and employment-intensive industries, and diversify the state 
economy.  One economic development official in North Carolina argued that communities ought 
to have the power to direct investment as they see fit, even if that means providing public money 
to private companies.  It was also regularly argued that incentives allow states to build a 
reputation as a good place to do business.  This is especially important to get the state on the 
radar of site-selectors hired by firms to find locations for new operations.    
 Incentives provide clear financial benefits for businesses; they lower the cost of doing 
business in a certain location.  Incentives can offset the costs of other burdens the state may 
impose—such as high environmental standards—allowing businesses to remain in the state while 
the state pursues its policy priorities.  Proponents recognized that, ultimately, businesses want 
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incentives.  Therefore, states should offer them in order to compete for investment.  While one 
business lobbyist argued that asking for incentives stems from a fiduciary responsibility to 
shareholders, many interviewees from each of the four categories recognized that companies 
understand that states will respond favorably to requests for incentives, and so they actively seek 
opportunities for more incentives. 
Journalistic evidence confirms the interview evidence by demonstrating that proponents, 
especially client groups, focus on the benefits incentives will bring to the state. Nike estimated 
500 new jobs, $150 million in capital construction, and an average wage of $100,000 would be 
generated over five years by “Project Insight” (Rogoway 2012; Gaston 2012). Tesla estimated 
6,500 full-time employees and $5 billion in capital construction through the year 2028 (Hidalgo 
2014).13 On wages, 4,500 jobs would be production associates paid $22.79 per hour, and the 
average hourly pay would be $26.16 per hour. In North Carolina, MetLife claimed 2,622 new 
jobs with an average annual wage of $81,891, and $125.5 million in construction costs (Tita 
2014).  These numbers were echoed by allied lawmakers when discussing the incentives. 
When challenged on incentives, proponents were ready with counter-arguments. Business 
lobbyists argued that awarding incentives to large firms is not special treatment, but a way to 
generate investment whose windfalls benefit many smaller firms. One business lobbyist stated 
that he/she argues that incentives are a way to fix existing burdens in the tax structure, making 
the tax structure amenable to investment.  The same business lobbyist argued that saying that 
																																								 																				
13 Tesla was much more specific in its job, wage, and capital investment goals than Nike.  It even set yearly job 
creation goals: 300 new jobs by the end of the first year, 2,000 by the third, 4,000 by the fifth, and 6,500 by the 
eighth. 
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incentives help corporations skirt “paying their fair share” misses the enormous contributions the 
private sector makes to the state and local economy.14  
Business lobbyists also commonly argued that incentives are not giveaways, but instead 
tools for the state to provide tax certainty. Certainty is critical, business lobbyists argued, for 
long-term planning and preventing the abandonment of planned investments.  While there is no 
guarantee of 100% certainty, argued one lobbyist, it is certainly sought by businesses from 
government.  This argument seemed to resonate with legislators, as several volunteered that 
incentives help provide the tax certainty that businesses need. 
Anti-incentive arguments focused on three aspects of incentives: 1) incentives are 
unnecessary, 2) incentives are offered in an undemocratic process, and 3) incentives are 
detrimental to state governments and taxpayers.  
Interviewees from each of the four occupational categories gave voice to the “but for” 
argument.  That is, it is impossible to know whether, but for incentives, the company would have 
located in the state anyway.  In fact, many interviewees from each of the four categories 
proposed that interested companies would likely locate in the state without incentives.  A Nevada 
legislator who supported the Tesla deal reported that he/she knew Tesla was not going to locate 
its new factory anywhere else: Reno’s dry climate with low-taxes and proximity to California 
make it the perfect place to produce and transport lithium batteries.  
Similarly, no one in government can know the minimum amount of incentives needed to 
keep investment. According to critics of incentives, states tend to over-bid for investment 
opportunities because of unknown competitive bids. Even if incentives are a legitimate use of 
																																								 																				
14 Business lobbyists also reported that they spend a large portion of their time shoring up support for the low-cost, 
low-risk of incentives, explaining that tax breaks on income and property that does not yet exist simply means that 
the state is agreeing to take a smaller share in taxes than it otherwise would in exchange for the company’s 
investment. 
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public money, overbidding is hurts taxpayers looking to get the most bang for their buck. Several 
legislators recognized that setting incentive policy is essentially guesswork; a lot of money is 
allocated to produce unmeasurable effects. 
Several competing group lobbyists argued that the negotiation of incentive packages is 
largely obscured from public scrutiny.15 According to competing group lobbyists, the lack of 
public scrutiny can lead to excessive giveaways, including awarding large sums of cash up-front 
without many strings attached, issuing blank checks, and even waiving a company’s tort liability. 
In other words, awarding incentives on a case-by-cases basis risks inefficient use of state 
resources. Many competing groups (and some economic development officials) advocated for a 
broader discussion of reforming the tax structure to attract investment and provide certainty as an 
alternative approach to incentives.   
Many competing groups also argued that they are shut-out of long-term economic 
planning. Business lobbyists, economic development officials, legislators, and the governor work 
together to develop comprehensive economic development plans that include which industries to 
target and how to use state resources to target those industries. Yet, without input from diverse 
organizations, state governments risk drifting from a public interest oriented plan and toward a 
plan that predominately reflects industry interests. As one competing group representative put it, 
states are now incenting “every Tom, Dick, and Harry” instead of large companies bringing high 
levels of capital investment. Originally, states targeted these so-called “buffaloes” because their 
sheer size was thought to drive economies. Now, incentives apply to any business that can 
qualify or negotiate. Furthermore, competing groups, and many legislators, worried that the 
general lack of transparency in long-term planning and short-term negotiation harms the public’s 
																																								 																				
15 More specific details on the negotiating process are provided later in the paper. 
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perception of government. It appears in many instances that big business is “wagging the tail” of 
the legislature and the legislature responds by providing special treatment. 
The crux of anti-incentive arguments, however, rests on the many reasons that incentives 
can be detrimental for states and taxpayers. Despite measures to reduce risk, there is always 
some risk of company failure or departure and the state losing part or all of its investment. 
Incentives also do not direct investment to certain areas of the state as well as they are purported 
to do. Instead, the data demonstrate that incentives disproportionately subsidize growth in urban 
areas because most firms want to locate their businesses near their customer and employee base.  
Thus, large portions of the state do not participate in the jobs and growth that incentives may 
bring even though they are paying for it through state taxes.   
The arguments about the detriments to taxpayers are numerous still.  Local government 
subsidization is largely unregulated, meaning wealthy counties can outbid poor counties for 
investment. The companies receive these local incentives in addition to state-provided 
incentives. It was also commonly argued that incentives shuffle jobs rather than create new ones, 
especially when companies receive incentives to move within the state. The lack of new jobs 
creates a zero-sum game between states where one state secures jobs but the others lose. There is 
also an effect on the state budget. Even if a state wins an investment using only tax abatement 
(i.e. no cash), it reduces the revenue it can collect from the investing firm. The resulting growth 
can strain public goods such as education, roads, and parks, with little additional revenue to 
improve and expand services.  
The encouragement of rent-seeking was also a commonly offered criticism of incentives.  
Incentives allow companies to play states off of one another to their financial benefit. Ultimately, 
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the incentive competition is a race to the bottom. As one business lobbyist commented, response 
to interstate competition makes states act like “lemmings off the cliff.”  
The evidence demonstrates consistent arguments for and against incentives. There is a 
clear divide between the actors with access—economic development officials, legislators, and 
client group lobbyists—and competing groups. There were clear signals from business lobbyists 
that incentives were beneficial for their companies and for the state.  Competing groups made 
fewer ideological arguments against incentives than may be expected, and instead focused on 
how incentives can be negotiated in a more open process that protects the state and taxpayers. 
Many legislators and, surprisingly, business lobbyists, recognized these process critiques. I turn 
now to look more closely at the process of negotiating incentives in order to better understand 
the facets of the process that make it difficult for competing groups to gain access to economic 
development officials and their agencies, especially when negotiating incentive packages.  In 
contrast, it is relatively easy for businesses to access economic development officials. A number 
of formal barriers and pro-business mission bias account for the discrepancy in access. 
Overview of the Incentive Policy Process  
Before looking specifically at the bureaucracy, it is important to establish how they fit 
into the larger incentive policy process.  There are three distinct parts of the incentive policy 
process that were evident in each of the three states: formulation, negotiation, and approval.  
Incentive policy is formulated in the legislature. The legislature establishes policy, including the 
amount of funding, purpose of the funds for each program, and whether the program is 
discretionary or statutory. If statutory, any firm that qualifies gets a set award. If discretionary, 
an economic development agency is given power to negotiate the value of incentive awards. In 
each of the three states, the legislature delegated the administration of statutory and discretionary 
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incentives to economic development agencies.  In negotiating incentives, the agencies gather 
information from the firms seeking incentives and make a determination of how much to offer. 
These agencies also provide business services, promote the state as a good location for 
investment, track incentive awards and job creation, and gather feedback from firms on the 
state’s business climate. The legislature does not formally approve negotiated awards unless the 
value or scope of the negotiated package outsizes existing programs. This was the case with the 
Nike and Tesla deals in Oregon and Nevada, respectively. In these cases, the legislature is not 
privy to negotiations but is asked to approve executive-branch negotiated packages by amending 
state law. The legislature also has the power to oversee incentive administration generally by 
asking agencies to provide audits of awards made, revenue generated, and jobs created. 
Client Group Dominance in the Bureaucracy 
In each of the three states, extreme barriers to participation for competing groups existed 
in the agencies charged with negotiating incentives.  Formal barriers that preclude public 
scrutiny are compounded by a conflict of interest in the mission of economic development 
agencies in each of the three states. The result is that firm-provided data is often un-verified, 
analysis of the secondary consequences of subsidization is often eschewed, and the agencies 
echo client group arguments for incentives in the legislature. Client group dominance in the 
bureaucracy, therefore, establishes a basis for influence in the legislature on incentives. To begin, 
I describe the economic development agency in each state. 
In Oregon, incentive responsibilities are granted to the independent agency Business 
Oregon. Business Oregon staffers provide information to businesses on statutory incentives and 
negotiate discretionary incentives. A similar delegation exists in Nevada with the Governor’s 
Office of Economic Development (GOED), although it is more closely tied to the governor than 
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Business Oregon.   In North Carolina, the legislature created a system where the non-profit 
Economic Development Partnership of North Carolina (EDPNC)16 handles business services and 
incentive negotiation, with any awards recommended by EDPNC requiring approval by the 
Department of Commerce.  
In order to make awards, these agencies gather information from the firms seeking 
incentives. This information includes the number of jobs to be created or retained by the 
company, how many of the jobs will be new (i.e. not imported with the company from another 
state), what tasks the job holders will perform, the jobs’ wages and benefits, what industry the 
company is in, the level of capital investment (if any), the product to be produced, and possible 
locations.  The agency may also seek proprietary information to verify the financial stability of 
the company. This data helps the agency understand why the company is seeking incentives. 
While a fairly extensive list of information is sought, it is important to note that agencies 
do not require such basic information as the name of the company.  Economic development 
officials in each of the three states reported making incentive offers without knowing the identity 
of the firm seeking incentives. In North Carolina, for example, the site-selection firm Jones, 
Lang, LaSalle approached Commerce Department officials in February 2014 looking for a 
location and incentives for “Project One.” Enough information was provided such that 
Commerce officials knew they were looking for space and money large enough to attract the 
headquarters of a major auto manufacturer. The state offered $107 million in incentives and 
proposed a location in Charlotte to the unknown company. When Toyota announced in April that 
it was relocating to Texas, Commerce officials figured they had lost the bid (Dalesio 2014).17  
																																								 																				
16 EDPNC is a non-profit organization jointly funded by taxpayers and corporate donors. 
17 Similarly, in June 2012, KLG Advisors contacted North Carolina for consolidated office space for a major 
insurance firm. In August, it was disclosed that the firm was MetLife when the CEO made a one-day visit to the 
proposed locations; the $87 million deal was finalized in March 2013. 
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A Nevada economic development official explained that if a company has a toxic 
“culture” it can get shut out of discretionary incentives, but the name of the company is not 
necessary to get a sense of the culture.  It can be ascertained by how the firm approaches the 
process; companies that demand incentives outright are likely “bad news”.  The impression this 
official, and many others, left was that incentive negotiation is an art more than a science.  A key 
facet of their mission that makes awarding incentives an art is that economic development 
officials are not targeting particular companies, but prestigious and desirable industries.  
Desirability of an industry is determined by whether it can provide sustainable growth and 
complements existing competitive advantages. Not knowing the company’s name does not, in 
the eyes of economic development officials across the three states, inhibit the ability to 
determine whether to subsidize a firm. 
Economic development officials recognized that they base their awarding decisions 
almost exclusively on company-provided data.  Sometimes these data are simply estimates and 
their analysis is done, in the words of one Oregon economic development official, in a “quick 
and dirty” manner. Analysis is usually done only on primary concerns, such as jobs, location, 
and spending, related to the immediate investment. Economic development officials rarely 
reported conducting analyses of secondary consequences of incentivizing investments, such as 
the strains growth puts on the local transportation and education system.  Two Nevada officials 
recognized that the sheer size of the Tesla investment will have major secondary implications, 
but this was not considered or analyzed at the time of making the incentive offer.   
Overall, officials across the three states maintained that they had enough time and 
information to make accurate assessments of whether and how much to offer firms seeking 
incentives. Yet, many did recognize that there is a clear informational asymmetry between the 
  
 31 
company and the agency (see also Hoyman 1997). Companies know what agencies have done 
and can do, but the agencies cannot truly know what cards the company holds.  This is especially 
true for determining whether the threat of locating elsewhere is just a bluff. 
Indeed, there are several norms and rules governing the negotiation process that make it 
difficult for agencies to gather information from sources other than the firm seeking incentives. 
Non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) are legal documents that prevent all signatories from 
discussing terms or sharing information with any third parties.  In the case of incentives, this 
means discussion of the firm’s proposed investment, company provided data, and potential 
incentive offers are prohibited from public release. According to economic development 
officials, NDAs do not affect the ability to gather information from the company, but it does 
prevent independent analyses and public discussion of negotiations. An economic development 
official remarked that NDAs can be seen as a component of secretive deal making, but 
companies have shareholders to protect and the last thing the state wants to do is something that 
could hurt the company and lose the investment. In fact, one official lauded NDAs because they 
encourage greater dialogue between the agency and the firm by reassuring the firm that their 
proprietary information will not be exposed. Firms desire NDAs (and private negotiations 
generally) because, as one business lobbyist put it, incentive negotiations are a business 
agreement, not policymaking. 
Economic development officials not only are responsive to client group requests in 
negotiation, but also echo their sentiments to the legislature. Economic development officials 
reported actively lobbying the legislature on incentive policy. One official noted that their 
lobbying role was often restricted to an educational role for legislators. That is, the agency’s 
official position was strictly neutral on bills unless ordered to take a position by the governor.  
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The agencies moved to take positions when the legislature was considering ending or cutting 
incentive programs, though. Over the time period studied, only Oregon and North Carolina 
considered cuts to incentives. Nevada did cut some programs, but this was to help pay for the 
Tesla incentive mega-deal. In these instances, economic development officials in Oregon 
reported using a number of tactics to ensure survival of programs, including keeping bills for 
different programs separate, consulting with the governor’s office, and providing examples of 
how incentives helped their ability to recruit and retain businesses.  
The lobbying efforts made by agency officials to ensure the survival of incentive 
programs is a manifestation of their vested interest in the maintenance of incentive policy. 
Without incentives, economic development as a career-field would be drastically smaller. 
Indeed, several interviewees from each occupational category recognized that state economic 
development efforts there has nurtured an “incentives industry” of law firms, accounting firms, 
site-selectors, and economic development officials in the public and private sector that have a 
vested interest in the continuation and acceleration of incentives. 
The effects of the agency’s vested interest in the maintenance of incentives is primarily 
evidenced by how they rely on information from the business sector.  Economic development 
officials in each of the three states noted that they regularly survey firms and consult with 
business leaders on the factors that influence their location decisions.  The business sector 
routinely reports to economic development officials that incentives are NOT the most important 
factor when deciding where to locate (See Appendix E for an example survey).  In fact, other 
factors such as quality of life, regulatory environment, energy and property costs, a talented and 
trained workforce, and tax and worker’s compensation liabilities are considered more important 
than incentives.  Yet, there was still near universal recognition by business lobbyists and 
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economic development officials that incentives are indispensable. Incentives help to start 
conversations and close deals, and firms use them to decide between equally good locations. For 
some industries like film, incentives are critical. If a state does not offer them, a production will 
not consider the state when choosing a location.   
Given the mission to attract and retain investment in the state, economic development 
officials are receptive to the use of incentives as a tool for accomplishing their mission.  Several 
business lobbyists and economic development officials admitted that firms do not need 
incentives to remain in business, and if they did that would be a bad investment for the state.  
Because other factors matter more for location decisions, lobbyists and economic development 
officials argued that states could drop incentive programs and still remain competitive.  
While the mission of economic development agencies spurs officials to seek out 
information from the business sector, competing groups’ input is ignored or discounted. 
Competing group lobbyists universally reported having little regular access to the governor’s 
office or agencies on economic development issues. Competing groups in Oregon reported that 
agencies complied with data requests, but they certainly were not invited into any decision 
making processes. Competing groups in Nevada, on the other hand, reported that agencies were 
slow or unresponsive to data requests. Across the three states, competing groups craved greater 
access to economic development agencies, recognizing that business leaders had nearly 
automatic audience with state officials. As one Nevada economic development official noted, he 
would take any business’ call because it could eventually lead to an investment opportunity for 
the state. 
Competing groups also argued that the negotiation process’ lack of transparency provided 
little time or capacity for scrutiny. This sentiment was recognized by some legislators and 
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economic development officials as well, although they were less concerned about it. For 
example, the North Carolina Department of Commerce approved several large incentive 
packages that eschewed public scrutiny even though they were made in accordance with existing 
state law. Each of these deals, once announced, exhibited issues with the veracity of the data 
provided by the company. For the $87.2 million MetLife deal, it was not clear how many of the 
jobs would be imported with the company from other states. Similarly, Sealed Air Corporation 
was offered $36 million in grants over 12 years in exchange for the consolidation of 1,300 jobs 
in Charlotte from closing offices in New Jersey, Wisconsin, Connecticut, and South Carolina 
(Tita 2014). But, like MetLife, it was unclear how many of the job-holders would relocate with 
the company. Sealed Air Corporation also claimed the jobs had an average salary of $120,000 
per year, but the average was probably affected by high CEO or upper management pay (Tita 
2014).  
The evidence demonstrates that client groups both benefit from barriers and encourage 
their creation. Quick analysis of firm-provided data is a process implemented by the bureaucracy 
in the pursuit of its mission. While some economic development officials reported firms 
requesting quick responses, it is mostly the officials themselves who sought quick analysis in 
order to provide good customer service to the firms seeking incentives. NDAs, however, are 
sought by firms. Though not all companies seek an NDA, the agency obliges if one is requested. 
Due to these institutional features, competing groups have a difficult time gaining access and 
influencing the content of incentive packages and programs. This is an especially large hurdle to 
overcome when the legislature must approve the incentive package.  I now turn to the reception 
of client and competing groups in the legislature during the approval of negotiated packages. 
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Client Group Advantage in Legislative Approval of Negotiated Packages 
When the legislature is charged with approving negotiated incentive packages, competing 
groups certainly have greater access than during negotiations but it is too late for any real 
criticism or analysis to be effective. From 2012-2015, two of the states—Oregon and Nevada—
negotiated large incentive packages with firms that required legislative approval. Business 
Oregon officials and Governor Kitzhaber offered a specialized deal to Nike worth $2 billion, 
later extended to Intel, which was approved by the legislature in late 2012. GOED and Governor 
Sandoval made a landmark deal with Tesla worth $1.3 billion in September 2014.18 NDAs were 
signed in Oregon and Nevada providing months of exclusive access and private negotiation with 
state officials for the firm. In both cases, select legislators were informed prior to public 
announcement. Newspapers reported that Nevada was a finalist in the open sweepstakes for 
Tesla’s new battery factory, though no details of the deal were known.  In Oregon, the existence 
and details of the Nike deal were a genuine surprise to the public, competing groups, and most 
legislators.   
Competing groups learned of the details of the large negotiated packages when the firm 
and governor made a public announcement.  This contrasts greatly with the long period of 
exclusive access the firm had with economic development officials, the governor, and some 
legislators prior to public announcement.  In Oregon, an NDA was signed between Nike and 
Business Oregon in July 2012 and was active until December when the special session for 
package approval was called (Gaston 2012). The package was approved four days later.  In 
effect, Nike had over four months of exclusive lobbying with state officials, while competing 
																																								 																				
18 Over the time period, North Carolina did not negotiate any incentive packages that required legislative approval, 
although they tried to lure Volvo, Toyota, and LandRover while having depleted JDIG funds. It is likely that, had 
those companies chosen North Carolina, the packages would need legislative approval.  
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groups had four days to lobby the legislature with its concerns. In interviews, one competing 
group representative reported that lobbying during the Oregon special session was “tokenism”; 
competing groups were invited to testify at hearings to fill a quota rather than have real input.  
A similar process unfolded in Nevada. The legislature approved the Tesla incentive 
package one week after public announcement.  Although negotiations were secret, it had been 
public knowledge that Nevada was a finalist for Tesla since February 2014. Thus, competing 
groups and legislators had time to consider the deal abstractly should Tesla decide to locate in 
Nevada. Nonetheless, the time from Tesla first approaching GOED officials to the announcement 
of the package was eleven months. From package announcement to legislative approval was 
seven days.  
Furthermore, according to legislators and competing groups, the Tesla and Nike packages 
were presented to the legislature as done deals. Some legislators reported that they were 
pressured by the governor and party leaders to not make changes or ask damaging questions.  
Other legislators in both states disagreed, saying there was room for some changes, but that the 
legislature generally agreed with the package and therefore made only a few changes. In all, only 
two changes were made to the Nevada-Tesla deal as introduced: an amendment requiring Tesla 
to offer its employees health insurance and procedures for the state to waive the requirement that 
the company hire 50% of its workforce from Nevada (Elkind 2014). Many legislators and 
competing groups argued that sheer speed of the Nike and Tesla special sessions made 
consideration of the costs and benefits more difficult. Some competing groups and allied 
lawmakers in Oregon sought a 10-month, rather than 30-year, deal during which time the 
economic effects of extending Nike’s single-sales tax factor could be studied and considered for 
the full extension (Esteve 2012 a; 2012 b; Zheng 2012). 
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During the limited lobbying time, competing groups spent their time trying to make 
practical changes to the deals rather than stop them outright.  Students in Oregon argued that the 
Nike deal should require the company pay a living wage and create guaranteed employment slots 
for graduates of the Oregon university system (Zheng 2012). One progressive lobbyist noted that 
Oregon was requiring surprisingly little given they were effectively reducing Nike’s state tax 
liability by 90% (Zheng 2012). Labor representatives in Oregon wanted requirements that Nike 
pay wages above the state median (Zheng 2012). In Nevada, labor unions wanted a guaranteed 
prevailing wage for construction workers building Tesla’s gigafactory (Hagar 2014). Competing 
groups also questioned the efficacy of incentives. One public interest lobbyist in Oregon made 
the argument that investments the size Nike promised could be secured by doing nothing; some 
business is likely to grow and invest as much as Nike or more without legislation specifically 
benefiting them (Zheng 2012). Southern Nevada-based labor unions and legislators worried that 
the Tesla deal would kill film jobs in Las Vegas to create manufacturing jobs in Reno. In effect, 
jobs were simply being transferred from one sector of the economy to another, and from one area 
of the state to another (Roerink 2014). 
To counter these criticisms, economic development officials, the governor, and client 
group lobbyists made open reference to the possibility of the firm investing elsewhere unless 
they were incentivized. This was the case whether the firm was from the state (like Nike) or out-
of-state (like Tesla). Nike claimed it was being “heavily courted” by other states but wanted to 
stay in Oregon (Rogoway 2012). However, at the time of passage of the bill, no specific 
competitor locations were identified; the lurking threat of competitor states was enough for Nike 
to make this point publicly. Tesla Motors shopped for incentives in Nevada, California, New 
Mexico, Arizona, and Texas (Wald 2014). While Nevada eventually secured the Tesla factory, 
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the competition was not over until the subsidy package officially passed the Nevada legislature 
(Lifsher 2014). CEO Elon Musk repeatedly emphasized the need to “move quickly and get 
things done” (Hidalgo 2014). California, previously eliminated by Tesla in their declaration of 
the finalist states in February, appeared back in the game in May when Musk praised a California 
incentive bill (Hidalgo 2014). The bill failed to pass the California Legislature before their 
August recess, but Democratic Governor Jerry Brown was rumored to be considering a special 
session should the Nevada Legislature fail to pass their Tesla incentives bills (Hidalgo 2014).19 
Lobbyists for Nike and Tesla, along with allied lobbyists and state officials, made clear that they 
would locate elsewhere if the negotiated incentive package was not approved.  
Client Group Access and Lobbying in the Legislature 
The successful passage of negotiated packages in the legislature is partly due to the 
advantages that client groups have in the bureaucratic negotiation process, but also from years of 
lobbying the legislature on incentives generally before the consideration of specific packages. 
Several interviewed business lobbyists stated that they attempt to “get buy-in” from legislators 
on general economic development priorities. The lobbyists reported that business associations 
would host summits for major firms, legislators, economic development officials, and the 
governor’s staff. These summits were used to develop relationships and discuss economic 
development goals. Business lobbyists in each of the three states noted that these types of events 
are typical. Journalistic evidence corroborates that incentive programs are often the result of 
policy formulation between the executive branch and large firms. In Oregon in 1993, Intel 
worked closely with Democratic Governor Barbara Roberts to develop the Strategic Investment 
																																								 																				
19 Similarly, when Switch was seeking incentives for data center expansions, the tech company claimed that 15 
states had better tax structures than Nevada for such an investment, including Oregon, Iowa, North Carolina, and 
Wyoming (Roerink 2015). 
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Program (SIP), from which Intel has received incentives four times (Hamill 2014).20 In Nevada, 
Governor Sandoval, his staff, and business leaders worked together to create GOED, which 
reorganized the executive branch in order to prioritize economic development (Domanick 2015). 
  Competing groups and even small businesses were not well represented in long-term 
strategic planning efforts. An economic development official in North Carolina noted the 
obvious absence of small businesses and other interest groups from economic development 
summits and strategy sessions. Instead, the biggest employers and peak associations with the 
most money and time to spend on lobbying dominated goal-creation and consensus-building 
efforts. A business lobbyist in Oregon stated that his/her organization would make campaign 
contributions on bipartisan basis for those who supported their economic development priorities. 
A close working relationship with the biggest players in the business sector is also sought 
out by many legislators. Most of the interviewed legislators across the three states noted that 
business lobbyists and economic development officials were sought out for information on 
incentives. These legislators also reported that conversations about incentives with these types 
were routine. Of the entire interest group community, legislators noted that economic 
development officials and client group lobbyists were the most active on the issue of incentives.  
In meetings with legislators, client group lobbyists began sowing the seeds that there is 
real risk of losing investment opportunities to states that offer more generous incentives. 
Lobbyists provided information to lawmakers on what other states were doing and highlighted 
instances of other states losing investment. One Oregon business lobbyist reported using the 
example of Boeing moving investment from neighboring Washington to South Carolina in 
meetings with legislators. Legislators were very responsive to these examples, reported the 
																																								 																				
20 The years of SIP-Intel agreements were 1993, 1999, 2005, and 2014. 
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lobbyist. The purpose of this tactic, the lobbyist said, was to counter “the arrogance of being 
local”, or the fact that people think they live in a special location.  Showing examples of home-
grown firms relocating demonstrated to legislators that their state is not special and that 
companies will seek out what is best for their bottom line.   
Client group lobbyists, wary of backlash against threat-making, framed the interstate 
competition argument sympathetically. They recognized that the state had done a lot for the 
business community already, but that other states are doing better things. Client groups were 
rightly worried, as divestment threats are not always received warmly by legislators. As one 
Democratic Oregon legislator noted about the Nike incentive package, Nike “had us over a 
barrel.”  He/she explained that, although frustrating, there was (and still is) no way to verify the 
legitimacy of threats. Thus, attempting to call Nike’s bluff had tremendous risk and “we would 
have really looked foolish” if Nike did indeed invest elsewhere. 
While certainly given more access than in the negotiation process, competing groups face 
informal barriers in the legislature. Competing group input was discounted by many legislators 
because of the perceived non-expertise of the groups on economic development. Discounting 
was readily acknowledged by both competing groups and legislators. At least three of the 
legislators interviewed noted that they ignored or were extremely skeptical of the points raised 
by competing groups on incentives.  Interestingly, this discounting occurred even when the 
legislator was ideologically aligned with the competing group. One competing group lobbyist 
from a fiscally conservative organization in North Carolina noted that most of the conservative 
legislators he/she talked with agreed with the points he/she raised.  Then legislators would offer 
the “but”; the legislators did not like incentives, but must offer incentives to compete.  A Nevada 
business lobbyist recognized the many misgivings associated with incentives, stating “In a 
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vacuum, incentives are criminal. But we live in reality. It is great to be on moral high horse, but 
then you don’t get Tesla.” Advantaged by their perceived credibility, premier access, and the 
specter of losing investment, another Nevada business lobbyist noted that selling the Tesla 
package to the legislature was relatively easy and his/her job was to ensure that “nothing got 
screwed up” in the approval process. 
The Effect of the Process on Spending and Oversight  
 With exclusive access in the bureaucratic negotiation process and advantages in the 
legislative approval process, client groups were successful in increasing incentive spending in 
each of the three states over the three-year period. But, there were important differences across 
the three states in how quickly legislators increased spending and to what degree they exercised 
oversight of the spending.  These differences stem from the ability of competing groups to 
controversialize incentives during the legislative program formulation process. In North Carolina 
and Oregon, competing groups were able to leverage incentive program failures to generate 
support for the elimination of some programs and restraining growth in spending.  In Nevada, 
however, the dominance of client groups in numbers and access led to rapid expansion of 
incentive programs with little oversight.  I will discuss each of the three states separately in this 
section, beginning with Nevada. 
Oversight & Spending in Nevada    
From 2012-2015, Nevada focused intently on targeting manufacturers, data and 
information technology firms, and solar power in order to diversify and grow their gaming-
dependent economy.  In 2012, Governor Sandoval led the effort to reorganize the executive 
branch to provide for expanded incentive effort and better relations with firms looking to locate 
in Nevada. In mid-2012, Nevada and the City of Reno awarded a combined $89 million in 
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incentives over 10 years to Apple for a new data center (Hidalgo 2012).  In 2014, the state made 
the landmark $1.3 billion deal with Tesla (Wald 2014).  In 2015, the state legislature passed a 
new incentive program to attract unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) manufacturers. Nevada also 
made headlines by awarding incentives to cutting-edge companies Switch21 and SolarCity.22 
Prior to 2012, Nevada had awarded one incentive package worth over $50 million.  
In Nevada, client groups are unified in the need to use incentives to diversify the Nevada 
economy and remake Nevada’s image. Commenting on the Apple deal, Mike Kazmierski, the 
president of Economic Development Authority of Western Nevada said “This helps us get over 
the hurdle of just being a small town. It turns us into a player, not just for data centers but other 
sectors as well” (Hidalgo 2012).  Interviewed economic development officials and client group 
lobbyists in Nevada also noted the need to change Nevada’s image in order to play for major 
investments, and move away from the “sin city” image.  As site-selector Dennis Donovan was 
quoted “You gotta pay to play, and Nevada did good enough [getting Apple] without giving 
away the store” (Hidalgo 2012).  
Encouraged by site-selectors, business associations, and firms seeking incentives, Nevada 
has rapidly expanded its use of incentives. Their input is unchecked by competing groups as they 
struggle to regularly access the legislature. Numbers-wise, client group lobbyists outnumbered 
other lobbyists twenty to one, a Nevada legislator estimated.  Of competing groups, labor unions 
have the most access to Nevada legislators, especially Democrats. Yet, they were entirely 
																																								 																				
21 The Switch deal included a 2% sales tax reduction and 75% property tax reduction for 15 years.  The Switch 
super-loop project will bring an estimated $1 billion investment to Nevada (Hidalgo 2015).  
 
22 As evidenced by the name, SolarCity specializes in solar-panel electric generation. Interestingly, SolarCity is 
another Elon Musk-led company.   
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excluded during incentive package negotiation and faced informal barriers during approval.23 
Running into such hurdles, one competing group—the Nevada Policy Research Institute 
(NPRI)—has resorted to challenging the constitutionality of incentives in the courts. NPRI is a 
libertarian group worried about that incentives distort the market and encourage cronyism. NPRI 
challenged GOED’s subsidization of SolarCity, citing that the Nevada state constitution bans the 
use of taxpayer money to provide public gifts to private corporations. Article 8, Section 9 of the 
Nevada Constitution reads “The State shall not donate or loan money, or its credit, subscribe to 
or be, interested in the Stock of any company, association, or corporation, except corporations 
formed for educational or charitable purposes.” The Nevada courts ruled, however, that this was 
allowed under Nevada law because the funds for incentives are first given to local authorities and 
then to private firms. There is no constitutional ban on local authorities providing gifts to private 
companies. NPRI is again challenging the provision, this time on the grounds that incentives 
provide an unfair advantage to SolarCity over other companies in the same sector.24 
During interviews in Nevada, compared to North Carolina and Oregon, there was less 
recognition of the downsides of incentives among legislators on both sides of the aisle.  When 
asked about oversight, legislators on the committee overseeing incentives acknowledged that 
they focused more on program creation and expansion than oversight. One economic 
development official in Nevada recognized a lack of focus on secondary costs of the Apple and 
Tesla investments at the time of the deals. Indeed, many of the incentives provide property tax 
breaks to companies, which is particularly costly for Nevada because there is no state corporate 
																																								 																				
23 The International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (IATSE) lobbied for the preservation of film tax 
incentives on the chopping block to help pay for the Tesla deal to no avail (Roerink 2014). Some labor-allied 
legislators wanted to guarantee prevailing wage for construction workers building the factory but were unable to 
amend the bill (Roerink 2014).  
 
24 Similar to Nevada, North Carolina has provisions in its constitution barring public gifts to private corporations, 
but the courts held that incentives are legal because they provide a public good (i.e., jobs). 
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or personal income tax. It is clear that Nevada, from 2012-2015, was in the midst of a rapid 
incentive expansion in order to rebrand and diversify the state.  Whether incentives had been 
used constitutionally, achieved job growth, created secondary issues, or strained the budget were 
not concerns to nearly every legislator and economic development official interviewed.  
Oversight & Spending in North Carolina 
In contrast to Nevada, North Carolina’s Republican Governor Pat McCrory struggled to 
get the legislature to expand incentives, succeeding only at the end of the 2015 session. Despite 
legislative sluggishness, McCrory, the Department of Commerce, and EDPNC were highly 
active in using existing funding sources to lure companies with incentives. In early 2013, 
McCrory completed the MetLife deal begun by his predecessor, Democratic Governor Bev 
Perdue. In his first two-years in office (2013-14) McCrory awarded $300 million in Jobs 
Development Incentive Grants (JDIG). About 29% of the JDIG funds were awarded to MetLife 
though the company brought only about 17% of the jobs estimated to be created by JDIG funds 
(Campbell 2015).  
Upon taking office, McCrory requested that the legislature expand North Carolina’s 
economic development tools to include a governor-controlled discretionary incentive fund. 
Incentive expansion was delayed, however, because it was tied directly to the legislature’s efforts 
to rework the tax code. The Republican-controlled legislature, especially the Senate, prioritized 
making North Carolina more competitive in its tax rates before increasing targeted incentive 
programs (Binker 2015 b). In fact, it even voted to eliminate certain incentive programs during 
the 2013-14 session. In 2013, the North Carolina legislature replaced film tax credits with a grant 
program, reducing spending from up to $80 million per year to $10 million. The most vocal 
business association against cutting film subsidies in North Carolina was the Motion Picture 
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Association of America, which warned of job losses in Asheville and Wilmington to no avail 
(Binker 2014). In 2014, 28 Republicans (including several legislative leaders) and 26 Democrats 
voted against the McCrory-backed incentive program expansion. The bill would have created a 
$20 million Job Catalyst Fund and expanded two other funds. During hearings on the bill, 
conservative lawmakers worried about favoring certain companies, the inability of the state to 
recoup losses, and the unequal and inefficient distribution of subsidies geographically (Jarvis and 
Frank 2014). 
The reduction of film incentives and delay in incentive expansion was the result of efforts 
by conservative groups to controversialize incentives. These groups hold ideological stances 
against incentives because they can lead to abuse of taxpayer money and encourage rent-seeking 
by large firms. The John Locke Foundation and the state chapter of Americans for Prosperity 
lobbied heavily against film incentives. These organizations claimed tax subsidies are “a corrupt 
government policy” (Leslie 2015 a) and provided information that cited high cost-per-job to the 
state.  Their data was backed by a report by the North Carolina General Assembly Fiscal 
Research Center that found that film incentives cost $400,000 per job and created fewer than 100 
permanent jobs (Curliss 2013).  With a newly elected conservative legislature focused on tax-
reform and a contingent of liberal lawmakers concerned with corporate welfare, competing 
groups found a receptive audience. As such, legislators engaged in debate over the relative merits 
of incentives versus tax structure reform, reviewed the effectiveness of film incentives, and 
curtailed the program when it appeared to be costly to tax payers.  
Nonetheless, the legislature decided to expand incentives in 2015. The bill increased 
funding for JDIG from $15 million to $20 million per year and added a $15 million optional 
“booster” for investments of at least $550 million. The bill also expanded the aircraft fuel tax 
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exemption, the data center energy tax exemption, and re-approved a motor fuel tax break. The 
bill, however, did not deliver on McCrory’s wish for a discretionary closing fund, and even 
tightened the rules for some grants so that poorer counties could receive more incentive dollars 
than wealthier counties (Leslie 2015 b).  Several Republicans and Democrats worried about the 
real costs of the bill. Republican Paul Stam argued that costs were likely to balloon to $400 
million, while his GOP colleague Larry Pittman did not mince words, calling incentives “an 
obscenity…stealing from the people to give to your cronies to keep yourself in power. That’s 
what it boils down to” (Leslie 2015 b). These sentiments were echoed by Democrat Carla 
Cunningham, who said “I support fairness, and I don't see fairness in these incentives. I would 
like to see us invest in the people of North Carolina by training them” (Leslie 2015 b).  
Nonetheless, business leaders and economic development officials were able to convince 
a majority of legislators to support the bill. In particular, they were able to leverage high-profile 
recruitment failures to make their case. Over the time period studied, North Carolina courted 
firms that were also looking at states as diverse as Georgia, Texas, New Jersey, Washington, 
South Carolina, Missouri, Illinois, California, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Kentucky 
(Ohnesorge 2014; Dalesio 2014; Rothacker and Portillo 2014; Dukes 2015). North Carolina had 
been in the running to recruit Volvo and LandRover manufacturing facilities, when they were 
dropped for other southern states.  McCrory and many lawmakers blamed the lack of incentives 
for the failure (Campbell 2015).  These looming losses were not salient in the earlier session, 
providing competing groups more leeway to criticize incentives.  
In the face of losses, needing a clear message to firms about incentives was seen as 
paramount. In McCrory’s own words, “I'm going to be very pleased to be able to sell North 
Carolina with a very clear economic development strategy that I can clearly communicate” 
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(Binker 2015). This was corroborated in interviews with North Carolina legislators, although the 
interviews took place prior to bill passage.  As one legislator noted, he/she had little doubt that 
the legislature would end session with an incentives bill on the governor’s desk in order to 
provide needed certainty to business looking to locate in the state. 
Oversight & Spending in Oregon 
In Oregon, competing groups were able to take advantage of an embarrassing tax credit 
failure to secure the regular review of incentive programs. The Business Energy Tax Credit 
program (BETC) was a tax credit implemented by the state of Oregon in 2007 that covered up to 
50% of the cost of eligible renewable energy projects, with a limit of $20 million per project.  
Oregon did not implement overall caps and it left the projects eligible fairly broad.  The result 
was runaway tax credit claims for anything tangentially related to renewable energy, from “wind 
farms and solar manufacturing plants to transit passes for Nike employees and lighting upgrades 
at convenience stores.” (Sickinger 2014).  Its open-endedness also led to it being claimed by out-
of-state firms, such as a Texas trucking company that spent an estimated 1% of its driving time 
in Oregon and claimed $4.5 million in BETC credit (The Oregonian 2010). BETC cost Oregon 
an estimated $857 million over seven-years with progress toward the job growth and energy 
diversification goals unknown (Sickinger 2014). But BETC could not easily be repealed, as any 
tax increase—or the elimination of a tax credit—required a supermajority of legislators. Further 
discrediting BETC was Business Oregon’s failure to track the jobs created or retained by the 
program.  The definition of a job was fairly unclear and, according to one legislator interviewed, 
Business Oregon counted federal penitentiary jobs that paid 75 cents an hour in its BETC job 
creation totals.   
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The abuse, runaway costs, and undefined scope related to BETC led Oregon legislators to 
implement mandatory sunsets for any tax credit (Lehman 2011; Sickinger 2014). Sunsetting 
allowed for regular program review and eschewed the supermajority rules for raising taxes that 
would be required if the legislature wanted to eliminate a tax credit.  Placing sunsets on tax 
credits was a policy advocated for by many of the competing groups interviewed.  They argued 
that sunsets helped keep incentive programs focused by requiring regular accounting of their job 
creation efficacy. Yet, additional pushes for transparency by other organizations have been 
resisted by Oregon legislators.  One issue activist disclosed an email sent by a legislator stating 
that additional transparency would hurt Oregon’s reputation as a business-friendly state.   
There is real cost to Oregon reducing property and income tax liability of corporations 
since Oregon is dependent on these as sources of revenue; the state does not have a sales tax. 
Over the time period, Oregon instituted huge corporate income tax breaks for its top 
employers—Nike and Intel.  In addition, it significantly reduced the property taxes of Intel 
through SIP.  SIP is a state program administered by local governments. Like the bureaucratic 
negotiation process, SIP deals are negotiated behind closed doors between local representatives 
and the firm seeking incentives (Gaston 2013; Hammill 2014).  The closed door nature of the 
Intel SIP renegotiations made public scrutiny nearly impossible. Several interviewed state 
legislators and competing group lobbyists worried about the adverse effects of SIP agreements 
on school funding.  Indeed, newspapers have noted that pressure is mounting for taxpayers 
statewide to help fund Hillsboro schools in order to make up for lost property tax revenue from 
SIP agreements.  A state legislator testified on this during the public hearing to approve the Intel 
SIP agreement, but there was no time to gather and present data. The package was a done deal. 
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The changes made to incentive programs in each state since 2012 reflect the interest 
group dynamics in each state.  Specifically, states place restrictions on incentives to the degree 
that competing groups are able to use a discredited status quo to change policy through the 
traditional legislative process. In Oregon and North Carolina, BETC and film tax credits 
provided such an opportunity, respectively. Each of the efforts, however, were dependent on 
having a majority of sympathetic lawmakers in office. In Nevada, competing groups were unable 
to slow spending or compel oversight in the legislature. Attempts to expand the scope of conflict 
to the courts in Nevada were unsuccessful. Even in Oregon and North Carolina, incentives 
continue to be used widely despite higher scrutiny; client groups and their allies in the executive 
branch successfully pressed for the continuation or expansion of incentive programs through the 
traditional legislative process. 
In incentive negotiation, institutional barriers exist that make access impossible for many 
groups. Major incentive packages were negotiated by the economic development agencies 
without input from competing groups. When packages needed approval by the legislature, they 
were seen as done deals and competing groups were relegated to “token” status. Mission bias 
pervades executive branch agencies and expertise bias is evident in the legislature. Client groups, 
as a result, are highly influential in shaping state economic development policy while competing 
groups are at a structural and instrumental disadvantage. Both hypotheses are supported by the 
case-study evidence. 
A Captured Process? 
 Borrowing from the literature on the capture and client politics, I find substantial 
evidence of client group influence of incentive policy. The level of influence determines the 
degree to which states expand their incentives with or without oversight. But, are the states’ 
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incentive policy captured by client groups? Substantial evidence shows that 1) there is a division 
in the preferences of client and competing groups on incentives25, 2) there is an active effort by 
client groups to influence incentive policy, aided by the institutions of the process itself. By 
definition, the first two conditions of capture have been met in each of the three states (Carpenter 
2014).  To conclude capture, scholars argue that a third criteria must be satisfied: that 
government consistently chooses to support the preferences of client groups over competing 
groups (Carpenter 2014; Yackee 2004). Nevada showed no evidence of concessions to 
competing groups from 2012-2015. North Carolina and Oregon were responsive to the input of 
competing groups in the legislative process. Based on the evidence, each of the three states meet 
the capture criteria in the bureaucratic negotiation process, but only Nevada when considering 
the legislative formulation process. There was no relief through the legislature and the courts in 
Nevada, but there was a responsive legislature in North Carolina and Oregon. Even on votes that 
competing groups lost, large numbers of legislators dissented and worked to amend the bills in 
North Carolina and Oregon. There was pro-incentive unanimity in Nevada. 
 While evident in Nevada, and at risk in North Carolina and Oregon, it is important to note 
that capture is not a theory that replaces interstate competition.  Rather, it helps explain, in a 
much more precise manner, why states are responsive to competitive pressure, but to different 
degrees.  By taking a capture approach, scholars can better understand why some states appear to 
be spending as fast as they can to attract any and all companies, while others are more restrained 
and exercise more oversight over incentives.    
																																								 																				
25 Specifically, Carpenter (2014) argues that there needs to be division between the preferences of the public and the 
interest group.  I make the modification that there can be division between competing interest groups.  In this 
formulation, diversity of opinion in the interest group community serve as a proxy for diversity of opinion in the 
mass public.   
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Alternatively, scholars have noted that client groups can benefit from government action 
incidentally. This is what Carpenter calls “protection without capture” (2004). Certainly, firms 
benefit because states compete. States may decide to subsidize independent of business input, 
such as for the potential electoral benefits provided to governors and legislators by landing large 
companies. Several interviewees, including several competing group lobbyists, offered this 
rationale. This perspective, however, does not account for the numerous hurdles that opposing 
groups face in the un-elected agencies, nor does it account for the agencies taking an active 
approach in lobbying for incentives. Capture theory, however, argues that repeated interactions 
fosters a shared worldview between bureaucrats and client groups. In each of the three states, the 
relationship between client groups and officials is encouraged because the agency is mission-
dependent on client groups. This mission conflict makes it harder for non-business groups to get 
access and easier for businesses to secure incentives with minimal costs.   
Also, many legislators may be naturally inclined to support business goals anyway. As 
Yackee (2014) notes, the election of a pro-business legislature should not be confused with 
capture.  Several legislators reported that incentives make sense because of the high return on 
investment and the ability to keep money in the hands of businesses, rather than government.  On 
the other hand, many legislators are a tough sell because they may be ideologically less inclined 
to support incentives.  Threatening exit, framing incentives as beneficial, building relationship 
with legislators are clear marks that client groups attempt to shape attitudes about incentives.  
The legislature’s relatively small role in approval of incentives also means that there could be 
capture of agencies without capture of the legislature. Scholars can study these issues more 
broadly, although with less depth, using surveys of the attitudes and contacts of state legislators 
and interest groups on incentives. Some larger statistical analyses have already been conducted 
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using a capture framework, showing that states spend more on incentives when the business 
sector lobbies and contributes more (Jansa and Gray forthcoming).  
As this study is of just three cases, one must be concerned with the generalizability of the 
findings. The evidence shows that there is remarkable consistency in arguments and client group 
dominance of the negotiation and legislative approval processes.  These lead each of the three 
states to respond to interstate competition by offering many different, high-value incentives 
meant to attract complementary industries.  The primary difference between the states—the 
ability of competing groups to access the legislature and build a majority during program 
formulation—bears strongly on the restraint shown by each state in incentive spending.  A quick 
survey shows that there are number of other states that resemble these three cases. Rhode Island 
is similar to Nevada in its recent use of large incentive packages and need for diversification. 
Michigan is similar to North Carolina in its conservative government, cutting back of ineffective 
small programs, and use of large incentive packages. Illinois is similar to Oregon in its 
subsidization of firms when there is a threat that the firm might leave or expand elsewhere. In 
2016, a similar package approval process unfolded in Mississippi, where a long-negotiated deal 
with Continental Tire worth $600 million was sped through the legislature. This is a fairly 
common phenomenon across the states and I am confident that these cases are typical rather than 
exceptions. Nonetheless, larger analyses must be undertaken to confirm this.  
Academic Contributions of the Study 
Substantial evidence from interviews and newspaper articles suggests very little 
disagreement among client groups, economic development officials, and many legislators on 
incentive policy. Incentives are viewed as a necessary tool in order to compete for investment. 
Interstate competitive effects are hardly a novel finding, but what this study provides is strong 
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evidence that the interstate competition orientation is explicitly fostered by client groups through 
repeated interactions with economic development officials and legislators. Barriers to 
participation for competing groups amplify the voice of client groups as counter-arguments are 
obscured and discounted.  
Extant studies also have difficulty explaining differences across the states in incentive 
policy, instead predicting a spiraling arms race. When competing groups are able to break 
through the barriers to build majorities in the traditional legislative process, they may be able to 
slow or eliminate incentives and provide for greater oversight. When legislators are unresponsive 
to competing groups, states are likely to accelerate spending in a fashion consistent with client 
group input. States offer more incentives with little oversight when the policy process— 
including from formulation to negotiation—is dominated by client groups.  
Implications for Practitioners 
Even if the findings are limited to these three states, they provide several insights that can 
serve as models for practitioners across the country. First, economic development agencies 
should be designed to increase input from competing groups. Interview subjects provided a 
number of potential reforms. One fundamental reform would be to re-establish economic 
development agencies with the mission of investing taxpayer funds in order to maximize return 
on investment.  Currently, so much of the economic development apparatus is dominated by 
selling the state and closing deals with little regard for whether the investment makes sense for 
the state and locality, especially in consideration of the benefits and drawbacks of reduced 
revenue but increased growth.  
Other reforms were offered short of mission-reorientation. One would be to institute a 
public comment period for proposed incentive awards, similar to regulations proposed by other 
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agencies.  Most incentive awards would proceed unimpeded, but competing groups and the 
public more generally would have the ability to voice concerns on controversially large packages 
or polarizing types of investment. Other reforms include allowing exceptions to NDAs for 
independent analyses, having a “devil’s advocate” position within the economic development 
agency to argue against proposed incentive awards, and mandating sunsets on all incentive 
programs. Perhaps the most intriguing proposal was to create an e-Bay style website that allows 
states to bid openly for investment opportunities.  This would help eliminate the information 
asymmetry that currently exists between states and firms seeking incentives.26 Each of these 
proposals aim to increase the diversity of input in economic development agencies and provide 
opportunities to make incentive programs more effective by directing the process toward a 
taxpayer and investment protection orientation.  The reforms are also likely to be much more 
politically desirable than 1) the elimination of incentives and 2) federal government intervention 
to regulate competition between the states. 
Many of the interview subjects recognized, like many scholars, that the process through 
which policy is made shapes the effect the policy will have. Having a policy process dominated 
by client groups could undermine the efficacy of incentive programs.  Policies and their 
outcomes may be shaped in a manner that benefits the few firms with premier access to the 
detriment of taxpayers, job seekers, and small businesses.  Process should be a paramount 
concern for economic developers. As these findings demonstrated, the institutions in which 
economic development officials operate and the interest groups with which they interact shape 
their ability to pursue the public interest. 
 
																																								 																				
26 In a study of incentive negotiation at the local level, Hoyman (1997) finds that information asymmetry is a key 
disadvantage facing public officials vis-à-vis site selectors and firm representatives. 
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CHAPTER 2: INDUSTRY TARGETING AND INCENTIVES IN THE AMERICAN 
STATES 
 
Economic competition among the American states reached new heights in recent years.  
In 2014, the states offered $8 billion in targeted subsidies—including tax abatements and cash—
to just fourteen companies in order to secure their investments (Good Jobs First 2015). In 2015, 
thirty-nine states offered tax credits for qualified productions to encourage filming at locations 
within their borders (National Conference of State Legislatures 2014). Most recently, General 
Electric announced it was moving its headquarters from Connecticut, its home for 47 years, to 
Massachusetts in exchange for $145 million in tax breaks and infrastructure assistance (Mann 
and Kamp 2016).  
Many recent examples have shown that states are not just competing with one another on 
their own volition, but in response to firms encouraging states to respond to what other states are 
doing to attract particular industries. When, in 2014, the California-based Media Rights 
Company (MRC) maxed out the allowable tax credits under Maryland law, it threatened to move 
production of the hit drama House of Cards to Georgia (or another more generous state) unless it 
received more credits.  MRC received an additional $11.5 million in credits from Maryland after 
Kevin Spacey, portrayer of the treacherous Frank Underwood and the star of the show, lobbied 
Maryland legislators (Condon 2014; Johnson 2014).     
Firms, as key players in the policymaking process, encourage states to emulate the other 
states that are providing more financial benefits from desired industries.  They point to these 
winning states as models for securing investment in particular industries. Yet, extant scholarship 
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tends to use geography as the basis of state cue-taking (e.g., Boehmke and Witmer 2004; Shipan 
and Volden 2008). That is, scholars have argued that states use their neighbors as models in 
policymaking, emulating them in order to remain competitive for investment. While some 
studies have begun to look past geography to similarity between states on other dimensions as a 
predictor of policy adoption (e.g., Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, and Peterson 2004; Desmarais, 
Harden, and Boehmke 2015), economic competition as a mechanism of policy adoption is mired 
in geography. Many studies find support for the hypothesis that localized competition is a strong 
predictor of a number of state economic policies, including welfare benefits (e.g., Peterson 
1995), wages (e.g., Hansen 2001), and economic development policies (e.g., Saiz 2001).  
Hypothesizing and operationalizing interstate competition as occurring between 
geographic neighbors only, however, ignores how state officials rely on the private sector for 
information on industry-wants and needs and which other states are meeting them. Instead, states 
respond to industry-based competition.  Industry-based competition occurs because economic 
policy is formulated by state officials with the close consultation of the business sector. Business 
groups encourage states to engage in industry-based competition because attracting industry 
targets creates benefits for existing and potential businesses.  
To test this theory, I model the adoption of large incentive packages across the fifty states 
from 1984-2014 as a function of industry-based competition. Using shared industry subsidization 
data from the Good Jobs First Subsidy Tracker—a database of all subsidy packages worth over 
$50 million awarded by states to firms—I construct a measure of industry-based economic 
competition that indicates the unique competitive pressure on each state in a given year.  This is 
tested side-by-side with the traditional neighbor competition measure.  I find that industry 
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competition is a stronger predictor of the repeated adoption of large incentive packages, all else 
equal.  Competition with neighbors does not predict the adoption of large incentive packages.  
The Logic of the Interstate Economic Competition Hypothesis  
Scholars have long pointed to interstate economic competition to explain the adoption of 
state economic policies. State governments must implement policies designed to attract 
investment or risk losing resources to other states (Berry and Berry 1990; Peterson 1995; 
Baybeck, Berry, and Siegel 2011). This process results in a “race to the top” in policies favorable 
to capital (Peterson 1995) and a “race to the bottom” in policies favorable to labor (Hansen 2001; 
Jenkins, Leicht, and Wendt 2006). States use their policies to create a favorable business climate 
that will attract investment (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Witko and Newmark 2005). 
The economic competition hypothesis is grounded in the idea that mobility confers 
inherent advantages to capital. Tiebout (1956) demonstrated that rational actors locate in the 
jurisdiction with policies that grant them the highest utility. Hirschman (1970) builds on 
Tiebout’s model by arguing that exiting (or threatening to exit) increases the likelihood that 
governments will respond with favorable changes in policy.27 Firms have the resources to locate 
in the jurisdiction that provides them the highest utility, whereas the labor force is usually tied to 
a geographic location because of lack of resources, opportunities to move, or familial ties.28 
																																								 																				
27 Scholars have also illustrated this logic using the prisoner’s dilemma game (Thomas 1997; Rodrik and van 
Ypersele 2001). Two governments can choose to subsidize a firm or not. The governments get the highest collective 
payoff if each chooses not to subsidize. However, a higher individual payoff can be achieved if one subsidizes but 
the other chooses not to. As such, both governments choose to subsidize and end up with a sub-optimal payoff. 
 
28 There are mixed findings as to whether the race to the bottom on welfare benefits is due to the poor actually 
moving to the most generous state, or whether there is just the perception that the poor will move and therefore 
states adjust their policies accordingly. See Schram, Nitz, and Krueger (1998) and Bailey (2005) for a discussion.  
There is little doubt, however, that firms are able to and do move based on the location that provides the lowest costs 
of doing business. 
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Scholars have also argued that states respond to interstate economic competition because 
of the potential electoral benefits. Lindblom (1977; 1982) explains that elected officials attempt 
to induce economic growth to satisfy voter demands. To induce growth, elected officials 
intervene in the market in support of industry goals. Additionally, large investments provide 
credit-claiming, ribbon-cutting opportunities for governors and legislators (Sharp and Elkins 
1991; Dewar 1998; Turner 2003). Credit claiming opportunities are especially hard to forego 
when the state is economically distressed, as lawmakers need to demonstrate that they are 
actively trying to help the economy or risk punishment by voters (Sharp and Elkins 1991). The 
pursuit of credit claiming opportunities by electorally minded officeholders helps explain why 
subsidies are granted despite their limited efficacy in achieving economic growth goals (e.g., 
Dewar 1998; Buss 2001). 
Operationalization of the Hypothesis 
Studies that propose interstate economic competition as an explanation for policy 
adoption almost uniformly define their hypotheses and measures in terms of geography. In two 
highly cited studies that test multiple mechanisms of policy diffusion, the authors operationalize 
economic competition in terms of geography. Shipan and Volden (2008) test four different 
mechanisms of diffusion—learning, economic competition, imitation, and coercion—and 
operationalize economic competition as occurring when states respond to adoptions from nearby 
cities (i.e. cities within a ten-mile radius).29  Boehmke and Witmer (2004) also attempt to 
disentangle learning and economic competition. In doing so, they use “the number of [Indian 
																																								 																				
29 In fact, the authors use geography to define each of the four mechanisms.  For example, the authors argue that 
learning occurs as the same policy is adopted “by other cities throughout the state.” (Shipan and Volden 2008: 842). 
Similarly, Boehmke and Witmer (2004) differentiate between learning and economic competition by creating 
different geographically-based measures to represent each theory of diffusion.  The “number of neighboring states 
with [Indian gaming] compacts” is used for learning, very similar to the indicator used for economic competition. 
 
  
 59 
gaming] compacts in neighboring states” as the indicator for economic competition (Boehmke 
and Witmer 2004: 43).  In the context of economic development, Saiz (2001) finds that states are 
likely to increase their own recruitment efforts as neighbors increase industrial recruitment 
efforts. This effect overwhelms alternative causes, such as political ideology, economic 
conditions, and fiscal capacity. Each of the above studies, as many others, have found robust 
effects for neighbor-based learning and economic competition.          
The convention of using geographically proximate adoptions to measure competition-
driven policy contagion developed from the sparse data and methods available to early studies on 
the topic. In his seminal study, Walker (1969) argued that policies would spread according to 
both geographic proximity and national information networks, but focused his analysis on 
regional patterns. The focus on geography has been emulated in subsequent studies, especially 
since Berry and Berry (1990). Berry and Berry (1990) pioneered the use of event history analysis 
(EHA) to model the time until a state adopted the lottery. They found that as the number of 
neighbor states adopting the lottery rose, a state’s probability of adoption significantly increased. 
In the context of the lottery, competition between neighbors makes sense; citizens can plausibly 
jump borders to play the lottery, bringing tax revenue to states with the lottery and a loss of 
recreational spending in states without the lottery.   
Geographic-based economic competition, however, does not fit as well in other policy 
areas. The rapid globalization of the economy means that states are competing for investment on 
national and international scales.  States set their tax, labor, and economic development policy to 
be able to compete for global investment opportunities.  Empirically, operationalizing 
competition geographically restricts evaluation to only neighborhood effects when competition is 
likely broader. Additionally, the number of neighbors, and therefore potential competitors, is 
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fixed. States such as Alaska and Hawaii have no natural competitors and are often excluded from 
analyses. Alaska and Hawaii, however, because of their remote locations, could be very 
responsive to what other states are doing in order to make themselves more attractive to 
investment. 
Studies such as Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, and Peterson (2004) and Desmarais, 
Harden, and Boehmke (2015) have begun to move past geography as a construct for diffusion via 
learning, finding that states borrow policy ideas most often from those they are like 
ideologically.  Economic competition, however, continues to be dominated by geography. 
Scholars have recognized the limitations of geography-based constructs, saying, “the classic 
view of policy diffusion as geographic clustering is often overly limiting, sometimes misleading 
(or even wrong), and increasingly outdated” (Shipan and Volden 2012: 782).  Now, the key is to 
find a replacement theoretical and empirical construct for economic competition in the American 
states.30 
Industry-based Interstate Economic Competition 
Theories and measures of interstate economic competition need to reflect the reality of 1) 
the active role of firms in advocating for favorable economic policy and 2) which states are 
looked to as models and, therefore, emulated.  
In formulating and implementing economic policies, state officials work closely with the 
business sector. State legislators routinely seek input from business. This is because legislators 
are political experts, not policy experts, although they are interested in good public policy (Fenno 
																																								 																				
30 Maggetti and Gilardi (2015) find that several studies of economic competition also use structural equivalence as a 
basis of competition.  Structural equivalence has been more widely used in network studies of diffusion in the 
international and comparative context.  The theory I articulate below is one of structural equivalence (states who 
target the same industries compete with one another) applied to economic competition among the American states. I 
also wed this approach to Karch’s (2007) influential work on how the political process in each state shapes the 
adoption of policies. 
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1973).  Legislators are uncertain over what level of policy to implement in order to effectively 
attract investment.31 Therefore, legislators turn to who they view as the experts—business 
leaders in the state.  Business representatives are seen as experts because they are perceived as 
knowing what businesses need to grow.  Ultimately, businesses have capital to invest which 
lawmakers want to uncork in the economy.  
By providing information to state officials, business representatives convey the need for 
policies that increase the attractiveness of the state for private investment.  While business 
representatives generally highlight the benefits and risks of not having certain policies, they also 
provide specific information on the types of firms the state should be trying to attract.  In this 
way, business leaders, economic development officials, and legislators work together to develop 
strategic plans that identify specific industries to target. This results in what is called industry-
targeting, or the process of shaping economic policies in order to attract firms in particular 
sectors of the economy. 
While meant to attract new firms, industry-targeting helps existing firms as well.  First, 
targeting helps establish certainty for existing businesses.  If government decision-makers 
establish a long-term outlook for the state economy, firms within the state can better make short 
and long-term investment plans. Targeting has the added benefit of selling the state to new 
investors. If existing business leaders and state officials echo each other on where the economy is 
headed, this creates certainty and attractiveness for the relocating firm.  Targeting can also create 
spillover effects for existing businesses. If a firm in an industry that is complementary to existing 
																																								 																				
31 In background interviews for this project, legislators often noted that setting economic policies (especially 
incentive policy) is “guesswork”. There was no way for them to know the optimal level of policy in order to attract 
investment but also protect taxpayers.  As one lawmaker noted, they are generalists who want to serve the public 
interest, so “we defer to the experts,” the experts being business interests. 
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firms is recruited, there is the potential to create a multiplier effect (e.g., Hoyman 1997) as the 
economic benefits of the capital investment and wages of the new firm are also accrued by 
existing businesses.  Finally, targeting helps the development of clusters of related industries.  
Existing businesses seek clusters because of the efficiency gains it creates by reducing costs of 
transportation and coordination (e.g., Morgan 2007). Landing a firm in a particular industry also 
has the benefit of building the state’s reputation as a hub for that industry—and thereby changing 
the reputation of the state for other potential investors. 
The economic policy regime in Oregon is a perfect example of this process. Oregon has 
developed industry-targets with the aid of major domestic firms such as Nike and Intel.  In 
particular, Oregon seeks to maintain and attract companies in their “Silicon Forest” information 
technology and green energy cluster. In doing so, it has maintained no sales tax, has property tax 
reduction programs for large investments on equipment and buildings (Strategic Investment 
Program), and had a generous Business Energy Tax Credit (BETC).     
While targets can vary widely, states consciously choose which industries to target. Firms 
in traded sectors, which are industries that produce goods that can be exported to other states and 
countries, are seen as the most desirable. Distribution warehouses and headquarters for 
manufacturers are also desirable as a way to lure or maintain manufacturing investment in the 
future. Some states try to attract companies that may promote a “cool” reputation, keeping with 
the creative class theory of economic development (e.g., Florida 2014). Some states adopt 
generally business-friendly economic policies in order to attract just about any firm. In 2013, 
Governor Rick Perry (R-TX) made a well-publicized tour of multiple, non-contiguous states, 
touting Texas’ pro-business climate in hopes of luring companies to the state. (Fernandez 2013). 
  
 63 
Due to the reliance on information from the business community, and the business 
community highlighting the benefits of industry-targeting, state officials shape policy to mimic 
the practices of states trying to attract the same industries rather than keeping up with geographic 
neighbors.32 As globally mobile businesses look for attractive locations broadly, states compare 
their policies to and respond to the policies of neighbors and non-neighbors alike.  
It is useful to think of states as existing in a complex competition network. There are two 
types of actors in the network–states and firms. State officials adopt the policies that make them 
attractive to the firms in the industries they want to attract.  Simultaneously, other states adopt 
policies to attract the industries they want to.  States are connected to one another, and thus in 
competition with one another, via shared attempts to attract the same industries. Unseen, but 
nonetheless omnipresent, is input from the private sector. Individual firms and industry 
representatives promote and reinforce the need for favorable policies, specifically tailored to 
attract industry-targets. Over time, a state’s economic policy regime evolves in response to the 
competition for industry targets.  
Following this logic, it can be hypothesized that the probability of adopting an economic 
policy increases as the state’s industry competitors adopt the economic policy, all else equal. By 
extension, the states should also be responding with the level of resources they dedicate to the 
policies as well. For this study, I will specifically be looking at the adoption of economic 
																																								 																				
32 The process of looking to other states for policy models is itself bolstered by the business community. Businesses 
and economic development officials routinely convey to legislators the fact that “poaching” states are out there. 
High-profile cases of companies leaving other states are used to exemplify the need for certainty, strategy, and 
generous policies. In background interviews, a lobbyist in Oregon said he actively used examples of other states 
losing investment (such as Washington losing a new Boeing factory to South Carolina) in order to sell policy ideas. 
Individual firms seeking incentives can seek competitive bids, or even bluff competition, in order to push policies 
onto the agenda and into law. Economic developers, themselves receiving constant feedback on the need for certain 
policies from site-selectors and business leaders, also convey the importance of business-friendly policies to 
lawmakers. Many economic policies, therefore, are promoted to elected officials by those with a vested interest in 
attracting investment—the business sector and economic development agencies. 
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development incentive, or subsidy, packages to attract desired industries.  Thus, the hypothesis 
can be formulated as follows. 
• Hypothesis 1: The probability of a state awarding an incentive package increases as the 
state’s industry competitors award more subsidy packages, all else equal. 
 
Incentive Packages in the American States 
In 2012, the Pew Center on the States called economic development incentives the 
“leading tool” that states use to expand their economies (Pew Center on the States 2012). 
Economic development incentives are fiscal policies that reduce costs to businesses in order to 
encourage investment and job growth in a particular location. Many firms can qualify for 
incentives by meeting certain self-reported job creation thresholds via formulas enacted by the 
legislature. States, however, can also award specialized incentive packages to specific firms, 
usually when the level of investment is substantially large. An incentive package is an agreement 
between a government(s) and a specific firm that reduces costs for the firm in order to support its 
investment in a particular location. Incentive packages can consist of cost-reducing provisions 
such as tax abatements on property, sales, and income and direct payments in the form of 
infrastructure support, grants, utility support, and low cost loans (Eisinger 1995; Bradshaw and 
Blakely 1999; Hanley and Douglass 2014).  
Incentive packages come in different sizes, but especially large incentive packages attract 
headlines across the country.  For example, in 2014, Nevada awarded Tesla $1.3 billion in 
property tax abatements and other incentives to build their new lithium ion factory outside of 
Reno.  These sorts of packages are usually negotiated between the executive branch of state 
government—the governor and economic development agencies—and the company.  If the size 
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of the package falls outside the scope of existing statute, the legislature must approve the 
package.   
What is most interesting about the negotiation process, and most important for this study, 
is that it is almost entirely obscured from the public.  That is, state officials negotiate privately 
with company representatives. State officials do not see the bids of other states. Even if a state 
knows that other states are actively bidding to secure the firm’s investment, they almost never 
know how much the other state bid.  This is because of the use of non-disclosure agreements 
(NDAs), the use of site-selectors, and rules preventing states from releasing proprietary 
information of firms seeking incentives.  Together, these provisions can prevent the discussion of 
project plans among public officials, disguise the identity of the firm seeking incentives, and 
even exclude the public and other interest groups from accessing the negotiating process.  As a 
result of the blind-bidding process, states put forward the best case they can to land the business 
and hope for the best.  Therefore, the main competition among states does not occur on 
individual packages but over the long-run. States attempt to position themselves in a manner that 
increases the likelihood they keep up with states attempting to attract the same industries.  The 
blind-bidding process makes incentive packages an ideal context for testing the theory: 
Incentives are the chief policy used to attract investment and states must adjust to what their 
competition does—geographic or industry-based—over time.  
For the purposes of this study, I will focus on large incentive packages only.  A package 
is considered large if it has a life-time inflation-adjusted value of over $50 million. Estimates 
show that these large incentive packages account for roughly 47 percent of all incentive spending 
in the states (Jansa and Gray forthcoming).  That is, from 2006-2013, the dollars awarded to just 
170 companies is about the same as incentives going to over 100,000 companies (Jansa and Gray 
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forthcoming). Data on large incentive packages is the most reliable data on subsidy spending by 
states,33 but they are substantively and theoretically important in their own right. These packages 
represent the locus of competition for industrial recruitment and are one of the chief ways in 
which states attempt to attract investment. This substantial area of policy in the states has been 
relatively understudied in political science studies of policy diffusion.   
Data on Large Incentive Packages  
The data on incentive packages comes from the Good Jobs First Subsidy Tracker 
database.34 Good Jobs First has gathered all publicly available data on subsidy spending across 
the states, including detailed data on incentive packages with a total value of over $50 million 
going back to 1984.35 The Good Jobs First data identifies 356 packages worth $50 million or 
more over the 31 year period. 43 states adopted at least one large incentive package. The 
database provides information on which state and company agreed to the package, the year the 
package was awarded, and the total estimated dollar value of the package. 
Missing from the data is a systematic industry coding system. I coded the data into 11 
unique industries. The industry coding mirrors the U.S. Census Bureau’s North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry categories as closely as possible while still 
allowing flexibility based on the purpose of the incentive package (U.S. Census Bureau 2015). 
																																								 																				
33 Data on subsidies below the $50 million threshold is dependent on the transparency of programs across the states. 
Some states report nearly all incentives awarded to businesses no matter their value, while other states regard the 
information as proprietary and keep it obscured from public view. Large packages are well reported across the 
states, however, as they are routinely tracked by national and local news outlets and watchdog groups. 
 
34 See Jansa and Gray (forthcoming) for a longer discussion of the database than is provided here. 
 
35 This study also makes the contribution of broadening the scope and detail of data on economic development in the 
states. Previous studies of competition and economic development policy have been limited to measuring policy in 
terms of indices (Gray and Lowery 1990; Jenkins, Leicht, and Wendt 2006; Saiz 2001), budget spending (Eisinger 
1995; Hanley and Douglass 2014) or case studies of individual incentive deals (Sharp and Elkins 1991). 
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The 11 industry categories are a function of the type of firm and the type of jobs to be attracted 
or retained by the incentive package. They are: Arts and Entertainment, Chemical, Energy, and 
Mining, Business Headquarters, Food Production, Health and Pharmaceuticals, Heavy 
Manufacturing, High-tech Manufacturing, Information, Research and Development, and 
Transportation. The NAICS industry classification, by comparison, has 12 major categories: 
Agriculture, Mining, Utilities, Construction, Manufacturing, Retail, Transportation, Information, 
Finance and Real Estate, Business Services, Education and Health Care, and Arts and 
Entertainment. See Appendix F for discussion of the industry definitions. Figures 1 and 2 depict 
the distribution of incentive packages across states and time, respectively.  Figure 1 also shows 
the number of industries subsidized by each state.  Appendix F also includes a figure which 
shows the distribution of incentive packages across industries. 
Once coded into industries, an affiliation matrix was constructed for each year of data. 
The rows of the matrices are states, the columns are industries, and the cell entries are the 
cumulative number of deals between that state and industry. A measure of the competition each 
state faces for its unique set of industry-targets can be taken from this matrix.  When a state 
offers an incentive package to a firm in a particular industry, the state is revealing its desire to 
target that industry.  Thus, subsidization is taken as a proxy for industry-targeting since the real 
set of industry targets is unknown due to the blind-bidding process. This serves as the primary 
independent variable, which will be used to model the adoption of packages over time in a 
repeated event history analysis (REHA).  I describe the full model below.  
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Figure 1: Adoption of Large Incentive Packages by State, 1984-2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Calculated by author using data from Good Jobs First Subsidy Tracker 
Figure 2: Adoption of Large Incentive Packages over time, 1984-2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Calculated by author using data from Good Jobs First Subsidy Tracker 
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Modeling the Adoption of Large Incentive Packages  
I model the adoption of incentive packages using an event history model for repeated 
events. The repeated events model, also called an inter-event duration model, was developed by 
Prentice, Williams, and Peterson (1981) and adapted for political science applications by Box-
Steffensmeier and Zorn (2002).  Specifically, the model adapts the baseline proportional hazards 
assumption of the Cox duration model to account for repeated events (Box-Steffensmeier and 
Zorn 2002). The standard EHA formulation usually used in the literature does not account for 
repeated events because states drop from the risk-set post-adoption. Thus, modeling repeated 
events in a standard EHA formulation can lead to biased estimates and wrong inferences by 
heavily weighting initial events and censoring future events.  Since states may repeatedly adopt 
by making deals with multiple companies over time, the repeated EHA formulation is ideal. The 
repeated EHA formulation also allows for the calculation of percent changes in the baseline risk 
of adoption, a key quantity of interest for testing the hypothesis and understanding the 
substantive effect of competition on incentive package adoption.  
Competition Variables 
The primary independent variable is the industry competition measures described above. 
For a given state in a given year, the adoption variable takes the value of the cumulative number 
of incentive packages awarded by other states in the industries subsidized by the state. See 
Appendix F for a map showing the distribution of the variable for the year 2014.  The cumulative 
number of packages offered by geographic neighbors is included to test for neighborly 
competition. There are no observations for this variable for Alaska or Hawaii as they do not have 
geographic neighbors. The cumulative number of packages offered by neighbors in industries 
targeted by the state is also include to test for the effect of regional clustering of industry-targets. 
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Additional Independent Variables 
Measures of several economic conditions are also included in the model. These variables 
include the unemployment rate, per capita income (in thousands of dollars), manufacturing 
concentration,36 and the proportion of the private-sector workforce that belongs to a union. The 
unemployment rate data is from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2015). Per capita income 
and manufacturing concentration data is from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2015). 
Private-sector union membership data is provided by Hirsch and MacPherson (2003), updated 
through 2014. These variables were included to control for how the economic conditions of the 
state may affect it propensity to offer large incentive packages. Increased economic distress 
(such as high unemployment), high dependency on capital-intensive manufacturing, and greater 
fiscal capacity may increase the likelihood of adoption of a large incentive package.37 
Specifically, unemployment was included as a measure of economic hardship, per capita income 
as a measure of economic capacity to provide incentives,38 and manufacturing concentration and 
union membership as a measure of economic demand for incentives. Each of the variables 
should be predictors of shorter duration times between incentive packages (i.e. have positive 
coefficient estimates). 
																																								 																				
36 This variable is defined as a state’s manufacturing location quotient for a given year, which is a measure of the 
relative proportion of the U.S. manufacturing sector located within the state. The data come from the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. 
 
37 Not only can these conditions increase the pressure for sustained job growth and investment, but they also can 
encourage individual firms to seek new incentive deals as a means of off-setting risks associated with investment in 
uncertain economic times. 
 
38 Other financial capacity measures, such as gross state product, were considered but not used because the 
measurement instrument used by the U.S. government changed in 1997, making a reliable time series impossible for 
the period studied. 
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It is also important to control for political conditions because incentives, like any policy, 
are the product of the legislative process.  Incentive packages are awarded either by programs 
created by the legislature or explicitly approved by the legislature. Therefore, government 
ideology and party competition are likely important factors that affect a state’s propensity to 
award incentive packages. The left and right-most segments of the political spectrum tend to be 
hostile toward economic development incentives, often branding them “corporate welfare” or the 
product of “cronyism”, respectively.39 Despite ideological misgivings, the electoral process 
presents incentives for politicians to respond positively to industry wants and needs. In 
electorally competitive states, elected officials may work to secure ribbon-cutting ceremonies as 
a way to secure victory over the opposing party’s candidates. Therefore, governments with more 
extreme ideology may be less likely to adopt incentive packages, while states with a greater party 
competition may be more likely to adopt. 
Data on government ideology is provided by Berry et al. (1998), who develop a 0 to 100 
(0 being most conservative and 100 being most liberal) score for each state government for each 
year from 1960 to 2014. The scores are based on NOMINATE common space voting and 
position taking scores averaged across the state house, senate, and governorship. I transformed 
the data into a distance from the median, or “extremity” measure by subtracting 50 from the 
ideology score and taking the absolute value of the remainder.40 
																																								 																				
39 Conservative economic ideology emphasizes maintaining a market free of government intrusion. Subsidies are a 
form of intrusion that can distort the market by giving public support to favored firms and thus a competitive 
advantage. Keynesian thought, on the other hand, promotes government intervention in order to reduce the severity 
and frequency of recessions. Incentives may be used consistently with this goal. Recently, however, incentives have 
lost favor on the left for being “corporate welfare”. Corporations receive support from government with the 
expectation that what they gain will produce broad based prosperity. However, government investment in 
corporations has not been reciprocated with higher wages and more jobs. 
 
40 Shor and McCarty’s scores were also used to measure government ideology.  The two measures correlate at r = 
.96 and the same substantive results were obtained with both measures.  The Berry et al scores were used because of 
the longer time frame of availability. 
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Various indicators of party competition were used, including the Ranney index, a moving 
average of the Ranney index, and an indicator for divided government.  The model results 
including divided government are included in the paper, although nearly identical results were 
achieved using the other two measures. The coefficient estimate on government ideology should 
be negative while the coefficient estimate on party competition should be positive. 
Finally, two other controls are included in the model. These include the number of 
packages awarded by the state in the previous year (recommended by Box-Steffensmeier and 
Zorn 2002), and the total population of the state. The previous deals counter controls for the 
possibility that 1) states spread out their packages strategically over time so as to not overburden 
budgets (a negative effect) and 2) states that have subsidized before are likely to do so again 
soon (a positive effect). State population is used to control for the fact that more populous states 
may have more capacity and demand for the use of incentives to attract new jobs. 
Model Results 
Table 1 presents the results of the inter-event duration model estimation. Model 1 
presents the findings if only neighbor competition were considered.  Model 2 is the same model, 
but swaps industry competition for geographic neighbor competition, just as Model 3 swaps in 
the neighbor-industry measure.  Model 4 includes all three measures of competition.  The model 
results confirm the hypothesis proposed above: incentive packages are driven by competition for 
industry, not competition with neighbors.  The only neighbor effect that is found is when 
neighbors happen to be competing for the same industries.  
This is a considerable finding given the extant literature’s focus on geographic-based 
competition.  As such, it is important to first and foremost unpack the substantive results of the 
model.  The percent change in the baseline hazard rate for a change in the independent variable 
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from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean, holding 
the other variables in the model constant, is a quantity that demonstrates the centrality of industry 
competition into perspective.  These quantities are calculated using coefficient estimates and 
standard errors from Model 4 and are depicted in Figure 3. 
What is immediately clear is that the largest impact on the propensity to adopt incentive 
packages is within-industry pressure applied by other states. For a one standard deviation change 
from below the mean to above the mean in industry competition, there is a corresponding 150 
percent increase in the hazard rate.  In contrast, the same magnitude change in neighbor 
competition produces a 15 percent smaller risk of adoption. This relationship is not statistically 
significant and is the opposite of what is usually found in the literature. There is a positive 
relationship between geographic neighbors competing for the same industries and the propensity 
to adopt incentive packages.  Moving from one standard deviation below to above the mean on 
that measure leads to a 15 percent increase in the probability of adoption, significant at the p<.1 
level of significance.  This is a much smaller effect than industry competition alone.  Thus, there 
is an independent and positive effect for industry competition among neighbors, but it is dwarfed 
by the effect of industry competition among all states.  Indeed, the effect of industry competition 
is larger than the estimated effects of all other variables. Similar magnitude changes in the other 
variables produce much smaller effects: government ideology (-100 percent), percent union (+50 
percent), unemployment (+50 percent) and manufacturing (+25 percent).  
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Table 1: Models of State Adoptions of Large Incentive Packages, 1984-2014 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Neighbor Competition .006 
(.004) 
-- -- -.019* 
(.009) 
 
Industry Competition -- .007** 
(.002) 
-- .007** 
(.002) 
 
Neighbor Industry Competition -- -- .020* 
(.008) 
.027† 
(.016) 
 
Unemployment .069† 
(.037) 
.061 
(.031) 
.060† 
(.036) 
.069* 
(.036) 
 
Union Membership .002 
(.032) 
.023† 
(.013) 
.003 
(.013) 
.026† 
(.014) 
 
Per Capita Income .012 
(.011) 
.0005 
(.001) 
.015 
(.010) 
.015 
(.016) 
 
Manufacturing Concentration .476* 
(.227) 
.422* 
(.214) 
.485* 
(.219) 
.416† 
(.235) 
 
Government Ideology -.006 
(.007) 
-.012† 
(.007) 
-.007 
(.007) 
-.012† 
(.007) 
 
Divided Government .067 
(.187) 
.038 
(.187) 
.010 
(.190) 
-.071 
(.184) 
 
State Population .002* 
(.001) 
.002* 
(.001) 
.002† 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
 
Previous Deals .003 
(.057) 
-.006 
(.061) 
.005 
(.057) 
.000 
(.064) 
N failures 231 234 231 231 
N at risk 
AIC 
BIC 
1,457 
1098.66 
1146.22 
1,519 
1113.62 
1161.55 
1,457 
1122.57 
1170.50 
1,457 
1085.17 
1143.29 
Note: Cell entries are coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Model use robust standard errors 
clustered by state. ** indicates p < .01; * indicates p < .05; † indicates p < .1. All models estimated in inter-event 
time (PWP). 
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Figure 3: Estimated Effect on the Hazard Rate for Incentive Packages 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The percent change in hazard rate corresponds to a change from 1 standard deviation below the mean to 1 
standard deviation above the mean in the independent variable, holding the other variables in the model constant.  
The dashed line indicates a 95 percent confidence interval in the estimated effect.  Coefficients and standard errors 
from model 4 are used to calculate the effects for this figure. 
   
To put this in terms of real observed values in the states, take Nebraska and Maryland for 
example. Over the 31-year period, Nebraska awarded one incentive package to a company in the 
food production industry.  There were eight other incentive packages awarded to companies in 
the food production industry.  Maryland, on the other hand, awarded incentive packages in two 
different industries.  There were a total of 75 deals made by other states in those two industries.  
Maryland, because of the higher pressure placed on it by competition for its desired industries, is 
about one and a half times as likely to adopt an incentive package in a given year compared to 
Nebraska, all else equal.  Similarly, Kentucky, with pressure from 169 competitive deals, is 
about one and half times as likely to adopt an incentive package in a given year compared to 
Idaho and its 49 competitive deals. 
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We can further understand the superior predictive power of industry competition by 
looking at the coefficient estimates themselves.  Looking across the models at the competition 
measures, industry-based competition is a significant predictor of the adoption of incentive 
packages, all else equal. When included as the main basis of competition (model 1), the effect is 
estimated to be positive and significant.  The same is true when controlling for other types of 
economic competition in model 4. Increased industry competition produces increased risk of 
adoption, all else equal.  
Weak results were found for traditional geographic neighbor competition’s effect on 
adoption of large incentive packages.  In model 1, the geographic neighbor competition 
coefficient estimate is not distinguishable from zero.  In model 4, the estimate is significant, but 
in the wrong direction.  That is, when accounting for industry competition and competition 
among neighbors for the same industries, as well as the other variables in the model, there is 
actually a negative marginal impact for neighbor competition on the adoption of incentive 
packages.   
There is a unique effect when neighbors adopt packages in targeted industries.  Model 3 
shows a positive and significant effect for this type of regionally-clustered industry competition 
on the probability of adoption.  In model 4, where the other types of competition are controlled 
for, the effect is again positive but only significant at the p < .1 level. In past studies, scholars 
may have been picking up on spatial clustering of similar economic planning when using the 
neighbor competition measure as a predictor of policy adoptions.  The neighbor only 
formulation, however, was limited because it ignored the true mechanism—states strategically 
seeking investment from particular industries.  The model results support the idea that states 
respond to competition from any other state pursuing the same industries and to competition 
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from their neighbors when they pursue the same industries, but reject responsiveness to neighbor 
adoptions generally. 
Turning to the economic predictors, the estimated effect for unemployment is 
consistently positive across the four models, although it dips back and forth across the accepted 
thresholds of statistical significance.  In the full model (model 4) unemployment is positive and 
statistically significant at the p < .05 level; when the unemployment rate increases, the risk of an 
incentive package increases, all else equal.  Manufacturing concentration is consistently positive 
across the four models; in models 1-3 at the p < .05 level and in model 4 at the p < .1 level.  
Union membership is estimated to be positive, but only marginally significant in two of the 
models. The effect of per capita income is not significant in any model.  
For the political variables, the coefficients on both government ideology extremity and 
divided government are in the expected direction. The estimated effect for ideology is significant 
at the p < .1 level when modeled with industry competition.  This suggests that studies that have 
relied on neighbor competition in the past may have been washing out the effect of ideology on 
economic policy adoption.  We should expect, given the role of ideology in structuring 
preferences on government involvement in the economy, that it would play a large role in the 
adoption of many economic policies across the states, including business incentives. 
Finally, state population is consistently positive across the four models, and is significant 
at the p < .05 level in models 1 and 2.  The coefficient for previous deals counter is positive in 
three out of four models, but never distinguishable from zero.  From the AIC and BIC model fit 
statistics, model 4 is the best fitting model. 
These results show that states compete with one another for particular industries and the 
firms in those industries encourage states to be responsive to competition for desired industries.  
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Although the bidding process is blind, states position themselves to keep up with other states 
who have won investment in their desired industries by adopting incentive policies that make 
them competitive for their targets.  As more states secure investment from a targeted industry, 
the probability increases that states will pull out all the stops to award an incentive package and 
secure investment. 
A New Approach to Economic Competition Between the States 
This study takes a new methodological and theoretical approach to understanding 
interstate economic competition and its impact on state policy adoptions. In doing so, the study 
demonstrates that the frequency of incentive packages is driven by industry-based interstate 
competition. Instead of the usual conception of competition among geographic neighbors driving 
policy adoption, states are actually responding to the actions of states with similar desires for the 
makeup of their economies.   
Theoretically, this paper recognizes that the policies that states use to remain competitive 
for investment are formulated by public officials with the constant feedback of those they are 
seeking investment from—the private sector. Scholars should expect states to respond in a 
manner consistent with business inputs, such as competition for targeted industries rather than 
competition among geographic neighbors. Economic development officials and legislators make 
economic policy decisions with deference to business leaders.  Business leaders are seen as the 
experts on what it takes to secure investments and, over time, they have shaped state 
governments into active bidders for investment.  It is difficult to correctly model state economic 
policy adoptions without considering the role of business in spurring and directing interstate 
competition, and therefore, policy adoptions. Policy is crafted around recruitment plans to the 
perceived benefit of firms within and outside the state.  There is an arms race occurring among 
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the states to secure investment from the private sector, it just is not happening on a geographic 
plane.   
This study also contributes methodologically to the diffusion of innovations literature. 
Future studies of diffusion can examine policies with repeated adoptions using specialized 
duration models similar to the one used in this paper. This methodological framework allows 
scholars to understand the process behind repeated strategic interactions between state 
governments over time as they position themselves for desired capital. More importantly, 
diffusion scholars should pay close attention to their operationalization of competition, 
specifically making sure it makes sense in the context of the policy studied. State officials act 
and react in a complex federal network where competition is not always easily defined by shared 
borders. 
This study provides a framework for extension in a number of ways.  First, spending can 
be incorporated into the model to determine whether both the number of packages and their 
value is driven by industry-based competition.  This will help explain not only the more frequent 
use of incentive packages, but their growing costs in an age of strained budgets.  Second, one of 
the clear limitations of the data is not knowing which states are competing on individual deals 
and what they bid.  A larger project can be undertaken to cull through newspaper accounts of 
large incentive packages to learn how firms are involved in individual package negotiations.  
Such an approach, however, will not be an exhaustive study since some states will remain 
unknown bidders through their lack of transparency.  But, such studies will help complement and 
confirm the findings of long-run industry competition in this paper. Overall, this study attempts 
to deepen scholarly and practitioner knowledge of how and why states strategically interact with 
one another in the federal system. 
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CHAPTER 3: CHASING DISPARITY? INCENTIVES AND INCOME INEQUALITY IN 
THE AMERICAN STATES 
 
In the United States since 1980, the incomes of earners in the 90th percentile and higher 
have grown rapidly while median income has stagnated (Piketty and Saez 2003). In fact, the 
incomes of most households has barely kept up with inflation over this time period. As it has 
become evident over the past decade that economic prosperity is not being widely shared, public 
and scholarly attention to income inequality has dramatically increased (e.g., Piketty 2014). 
Recently, scholars have begun studying inequality at the state-level (e.g., Kelly and Witko 2012), 
trying to answer an important research question: what effect do state policies have on income 
inequality, and why? 
States are seen as laboratories of democracy; fifty different governments whose 
experiments with tax, labor, and welfare polices can inform which policies exacerbate inequality 
and which mitigate it.  Income inequality in particular poses challenges to state governments and 
their budgets that foster experimentation and can inform best practices. Growing disparity limits 
tax revenue and strains public programs serving a growing population with unequal resources.41 
Legislators in many states have attempted to increase wages and economic opportunity by using 
economic development incentives to attract investment and create jobs for their states’ citizens.  
																																								 																				
41 According to a Standard & Poor’s analysis of income inequality in the states, the strain on budgets is created by 
stagnant wages, and thus tax revenue, from most of the population.  The strain is made worse because the wealthy 
have the resources to shield their growing incomes from taxation but the majority of citizen’s wages have stagnated 
(Boak 2014). 
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Economic development incentives are fiscal policies that reduce costs to businesses in 
order to encourage investment and job growth in a particular location. State officials and 
business leaders justify incentives as a way to create jobs and stimulate economic growth.42 This 
has the end goal of increasing income and prosperity. The efficacy of incentives, however, is 
questionable as studies have consistently shown that incentives do not significantly increase 
employment, income, and GDP (e.g., Brace 1993; Buss 2001; Dewar 1998).    
The absence of intended outcomes does not mean that there is no effect of incentives on 
state economies. Subsidization is intended to create jobs and grow the economy by conditioning 
the state’s market to make it friendlier to businesses, especially the wealthiest businesses with 
the most resources to invest. While the intended job creation and income effects may be 
negligible, incentives make markets friendlier for businesses and their wealthy investors, and 
thus can increase income disparity in the state. Yet, the relationship between this central area of 
state policy and income inequality has been rarely tested. When it has, scholars have found 
mixed results using policy indices only. 
In this paper, I aim to test whether state economic development incentives increase 
income inequality. In doing so, I gather data on the amount spent on incentives across the states 
for a twenty-three-year period (1984-2006). A time-series cross-sectional error correction model 
is used to test the hypothesis, and shows that higher levels of incentive spending lead to increases 
in income inequality. This relationship holds when controlling for other state-level economic 
policies, conditions, politics, and demographics. Splitting incentive spending into entrepreneurial 
and locational spending, it is clear that public money spent trying to attract firms (locational) 
increases income inequality. There is no effect for entrepreneurial spending on inequality. 
																																								 																				
42 There are other justifications as well including, but not limited to, keeping up with competition, creating certainty 
for firms, directing investment to areas of the state in the most need, and to diversify the economy.  
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Theoretically, this study is critically important because it refocuses the literature on a 
central focus of subnational governments—economic development.  A theory of spending on 
incentives, not just the policies themselves, is built so that scholars can make sense of how states 
condition markets to produce higher inequality.  Practically, while state officials intend to use 
public funds to compete for investment, they may be actually exacerbating the gap between rich 
and poor by distributing public funds to those least in need.  Economic developers and legislators 
can use this study to learn how to amend incentive policy to best achieve economic growth 
without stoking disparity.   
Economic Development Incentives in the American States 
To begin, it is important to understand the dynamics of state-level economic development 
incentives. Incentives include such cost-reducing tools as property, sales, and income tax credits 
and rebates, tax abatements, cash grants, cost reimbursements, and infrastructure assistance. 
Collectively, the states spend billions every year in economic development incentives. Figure 4 
shows the growth of incentive spending from 1984-2006, adjusted for inflation.43 In 1984, the 
states collectively spent about $200 million on incentives. By 1991, the states eclipsed the $1 
billion dollar per year mark. In 2006, the states directly paid or reduced the tax liability of private 
firms by $7.6 billion.  In all, states subsidized corporations to the tune of $45 billion over the 
twenty-three-year period.  
Indeed, economic development incentives are so prevalently used that they have been 
called “the leading tool used by states to grow their economies” (Pew Center 2012). Often times, 
incentives are packaged together in order to lure major projects from out-of-state, or maintain 
major investments in the state, as part of a locational economic development strategy. For 
																																								 																				
43 Data for the figure is taken from the Good Jobs First Subsidy Tracker database, which will be discussed in greater 
detail to follow. 
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example, in 2016, Mississippi borrowed $260 million through bonds to help pay for Continental 
Tire’s planned $1.4 billion investment in Hinds County.  The state also awarded $340 million in 
income and property tax reductions to Continental Tire.  The state looked to end chronic 
joblessness and extremely high income inequality in the area by subsidizing 2,500 jobs at 
$40,000 annually at the new Continental tire plant (Pender and Hall 2016).  
Figure 4: Increased Incentive Spending in the American States, 1984-2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Spending data calculated by author using Good Jobs First Subsidy Tracker data. 
 
As with the Continental Tire case, the companies promising the biggest investment and 
most jobs tend to receive the most in incentives. Jansa and Gray (forthcoming) find that the top 
recipients of incentives tend to be the wealthiest, most prestigious firms in the world; from 2006 
to 2013, 31 of the 50 corporations that received the most incentives from state governments were 
Fortune 500 firms. Table 2 shows the top 10 recipients of state economic development incentives 
for the period 1984-2006 and how much they received.  With the exception of the now-defunct 
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Northwest Airlines and the lesser-known Pyramid Companies, the notable quality of the 
companies in Table 2 is their notoriety and prestige in their respective industries. Also note that 
nearly $4 billion separates Intel (the top recipient) from Pyramid Companies (the tenth highest 
recipient).  If the table were extended to the top 100, the 100th company (Sprit Aerosystems) 
received “only” $96 million in incentives. The distribution of incentives is extremely skewed 
toward a few, extremely wealthy firms.44  
Table 2: Top 10 Corporate Recipients of State-level Incentives, 1984-2006 
Company Total 
Intel $4,830,589,354.00 
Boeing $4,356,668,670.00 
Nissan $2,244,342,403.00 
Northwest Airlines $1,437,932,936.00 
Advanced Micro Devices $1,397,154,761.00 
General Motors $1,254,415,768.00 
IBM $895,741,114.00 
Ford Motor $837,854,773.00 
Pyramid Companies $779,456,364.00 
Note: Calculated by author using Good Jobs First Subsidy Tracker data 
Growing Inequality in the American States 
The acceleration of economic development incentives in the American states coincides 
with increased income inequality. Interestingly, income is increasingly concentrated among 
wealthy households just as incentive spending is highly concentrated among the wealthiest firms. 
Figure 5 shows the growth in average market inequality across the states over the time period. 
Market inequality is measured as a Gini coefficient for each state for each year on household 
income not earned through government programs.45 In 1984, the average market inequality was 
																																								 																				
44 Jansa and Gray (forthcoming) have a more in depth analysis of the skewed distribution.  They find that the 
average incentive award from 2006-2013 was $89,000, but the top recipient (Boeing) received over $10 billion in 
incentives. 
 
45 This includes any household-level income from wages, private retirement plans and pensions, interest, dividends, 
rents, royalties, and other private sources of income. 
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0.465.46 Inequality grew steadily in the 1980s and 1990s, steeply increasing in 1994 to a Gini of 
0.508. Market inequality continued to grow slightly, with some fluctuations, through 2006.  
Figure 5: Increased Inequality in the American States, 1984-2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Market inequality data from Kelly and Witko (2012). 
Underlying the increase in state-level market inequality is the same problem discussed in 
the introduction: economic growth is outpacing median income growth.  That is, most of the new 
income is being earned by top earners while most others are not sharing in new prosperity. The 
Pew Center reported that from 2000-2013 the percentage increase in GDP was much larger than 
the percentage increase in median income in every single state, widening the gap between rich 
and poor (Henderson 2015) and straining state budgets (Boak 2014).   
																																								 																				
46 The highest possible value is 1, meaning all income is concentrated with one person/household.  The lowest is 0 
indicating equal income across all individuals/households. 
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States, however, vary greatly in income inequality. The most equal state over the time 
period is Alaska 1989, which had a market Gini of 0.385.  In contrast, Rhode Island in 1997 had 
the highest market inequality with a Gini of 0.599.  In 2006, the state with the most equal 
distribution of income was Utah (market Gini = 0.442) and the state with the most unequal 
distribution was Louisiana (market Gini = 0.583).  On spending, the states vary greatly as well. 
Figure 6 depicts a map of the states colored by per capita incentive spending accumulated from 
1984-2006.  There are not strongly defined regions in terms of spending, but certain Rust Belt, 
Southern, and Border states tend to spend more per capita than others. The state with the highest 
per capita spending over the twenty-three-year period is Alaska (~$1400 per capita), while 
several states had less than $20 per capita.  
Figure 6: Per Capita Incentive Spending by State, 1984-2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Calculated by the author using the Good Jobs First Subsidy Tracker data 
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State Redistributive Policy and Income Inequality 
Looking at the extant literature on state policy and inequality, it is unclear what role 
incentives play as scholars have predominately focused on redistributive policy. At both the 
federal and state-level, scholars have consistently found that governments can affect income 
disparity through programs that redistribute resources to the neediest citizens (Plotnick and 
Winters 1985; Pierson 1995; Hacker 2002; Piketty and Saez 2003). Indeed, scholars have found 
that increased inequality nationally corresponds to the retrenchment of welfare policy (Pierson 
1995) and the increased reliance on private firms to provide a social safety net (Hacker 2002; 
Faricy 2011).  Through redistribution, governments intervene to correct extreme inequities 
produced by the marketplace. 
At the state-level, scholars have found mixed evidence on the ability of states to correct 
inequality through redistributive policies. Barrilleaux and Davis (2003) find small effects of 
redistributive policies on income inequality, and these policies tend to increase inequality. 
Studies examining the effect of both state and federal redistributive policies find that state-level 
effects are dwarfed by the efforts of the federal government (Kelly 2009; Kelly and Witko 2012). 
Not only can government redistribute resources, but it can also condition the market to 
make it more or less equal.  Indeed, several prominent studies have focused on market 
conditioning, or the ability of government, through the policies it implements, to shape economic 
activity in a manner that may produce more or less inequality (Kelly 2005, 2009; Faricy 2011; 
Kelly and Witko 2012; Hatch and Rigby 2015; Hayes and Medina Vidal 2015). Nationally, 
growing disparity can also be traced to market conditioning tax credits lobbied for by the 
business sector (Hacker and Pierson 2010; Mettler 2011; see also Bartels 2008; Gilens 2012; 
Hayes 2013). These policies (and similar others that favor wealthy individuals) subsidize market 
  
 88 
behaviors that are more accessible to the wealthy, such as home ownership (Mettler 2011). 
Through market conditioning, government policies make the economy more or less equal prior to 
explicit redistribution of wealth upward or downward.  
Perhaps counter-intuitively, redistributive policies can have redistributive effects and 
market conditioning effects. In fact, it is redistributive policies that scholars have focused on in 
their studies of market conditioning and inequality at the state-level. Hatch and Rigby (2015) 
find that taxes on the wealthy, taxes on the poor, and pro-labor market policies (i.e. no right to 
work law, high minimum wage) decrease inequality. But, the authors also find that spending on 
the poor increases inequality, possibly due to states conditioning welfare dependency. Hayes and 
Medina Vidal (2015), on the other hand, find that welfare payments and unemployment 
compensation reduce inequality.   
State Economic Development and Income Inequality 
Less attention has been paid to the effect of state economic development policy on 
income inequality. This is surprising given that state governments focus on developmental policy 
rather than redistributive policy (Eisinger 1988, 1995; Peterson 1995).  Scholars have repeatedly 
noted that states shape policy to foster a business-friendly climate (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; 
Witko and Newmark 2005).  This is done to compete for investment from wealthy citizens and 
firms (Berry and Berry 1990; Baybeck, Berry, and Siegel 2011). In competing, states attempt to 
keep wages and taxes low (Hansen 2001; Jenkins, Leicht, and Wendt 2006) and provide 
generous benefits to firms in the form of economic development incentives (Grady 1987; Hanson 
1993; Saiz 2001; Jansa and Gray forthcoming).  
Just two studies have looked explicitly at the relationship between state-level economic 
development policy and income inequality. Langer (2001) finds that locational economic 
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development policies—state programs aimed specifically at attracting and retaining firms to the 
state—increased income inequality in the states, while entrepreneurial economic development 
policies—state programs aimed at fostering the development of new firms in the state—
decreased inequality. Young (2016), however, finds the opposite of Langer (2001); 
entrepreneurial policies are associated with rising inequality and there is no effect for locational 
policies. 
The mixed results of extant studies indicate that extensions of theory and methodology 
are needed for scholars to understand how states may be affecting inequality through their use of 
incentives. On theory, Young and Langer argue that state economic development efforts drain 
public resources that could otherwise be redistributed, thereby reducing inequality.  While this is 
true, it misses the heart of what economic development policy does: distributes public monies 
directly to firms.  The distribution is made with the expectation that firms will use the money to 
employ workers at decent wages.  In other words, state governments are using economic 
development policy to condition the marketplace to produce certain outcomes. The market 
conditioning mechanism may also affect the level of inequality.  
Methodologically, both Young (2016) and Langer (2001) use policy indices to measure 
state locational and entrepreneurial effort.  But what is important is not the number of programs 
but the amount of money states commit to economic development.47 Mirroring this logic, 
scholars of income inequality and redistributive policy have measured how much states spend on 
welfare programs (e.g., Hayes and Medina Vidal 2015). No study has looked at the effect of 
incentive spending on income inequality. 
																																								 																				
47 The indices used by Young (2016), developed by Saiz (2001), do not correlate well with spending. The 
entrepreneurial spending measure discussed later in the paper correlates with the entrepreneurial policy index 0.31, 
while locational spending correlates with locational policy index an astoundingly weak -0.02.  Indices alone cannot 
capture state economic development effort.  
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A Theory of Incentives and Market Conditioning in the American States 
States attempt to make their markets amenable to business by implementing policies that 
encourage investment, including providing monetary benefits to private firms in the form of 
economic development incentives. As states award incentives, resources are disproportionately 
distributed to relatively wealthy firms. The result is that incentives both redistribute wealth 
upward and that shape the state’s economy to be beneficial to the bottom line of the wealthiest 
firms, their investors, and employees. Specifically, incentives have a conditioning effect that 
creates greater inequality through the subsidization jobs for those who already have them, 
financing of normal market behavior, and encouragement of rent-seeking. I explain these market 
conditioning mechanisms below.    
Subsidizing Existing Job-Holders 
Incentives are meant to give businesses more resources to expand or relocate, and hire 
workers. In effect, however, the state is paying for the creation of jobs that either 1) already exist 
elsewhere or 2) benefit those who already have similar jobs elsewhere.  
Often, companies receive incentives to relocate from another state. When this happens, 
existing jobs can be “imported” with the company from their previous location to the state that 
won the firm’s investment. That is, those who currently hold the job move with the firm. When 
not directly imported, firms may still fill new positions with applicants from a national talent 
pool, rather than providing jobs for locals in need.  For example, if an insurance company 
receives incentives to relocate from Virginia to North Carolina and it brings its employees with 
it, North Carolina paid the company to bring its jobs but not to employ its citizens.  If those jobs 
are relatively high paying, North Carolina used public funds to add to its upper class but did not 
create jobs for the middle or working classes. This slowly but surely increases the gap between 
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rich and poor, although not through the differential income growth mechanism normally 
associated with growing inequality. 
States sometimes provide that companies must hire a certain number of workers from the 
local talent pool. Even when this happens, inequality can increase because 1) they are positions 
for which workers who already have jobs are most likely to qualify or 2) they are such low 
paying jobs (in retail, for example) that it makes little difference on raising incomes for low 
earners.  In both these cases, public dollars are used to provide more for those who already have 
lucrative work, rather than those out of work or in need of higher paid work.48 Additionally, 
monetary compensation for jobs is awarded to the job-provider, not the job-earner; benefits 
accrue to the company without real job or income growth in the larger economy. This widens the 
income gap, especially between those with the requisite skills, qualifications, and connections 
and those without. 
Financing Normal Market Behavior 
Incentives pay for what a firm may have done on its own.49  Firms make decisions to 
expand and relocate and hire more people because it is profitable. Thus, by providing incentives, 
the state denies itself tax revenue to help a firm make the investments it would have needed to 
carry out anyway in order to compete in the marketplace.50 This lost revenue could have been 
used to fund education, transportation, and community programs, which help to increase the 
																																								 																				
48 The exception to this is the use of incentives for heavy manufacturing plants, which employ low-skill and 
underemployed workers on the factory floor.  Incentives, however, are used for a number of industries, including in 
the low-paying service sector and high-pay, high-barrier sectors such as finance, insurance, and real estate 
development. 
 
49 See Coyne and Moberg (2014) for an excellent discussion of this logic. 
 
50 As one opponent of incentives in North Carolina noted, firms that need incentives to stay afloat are risky 
investments that the government should not sink money into, while firms that do not need incentives just should not 
be invested in because they do not need them to remain competitive and make investments.    
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earnings potential of citizens by providing skills and the means of making money. This is 
essentially the argument of Langer (2001) and Young (2016). 
More importantly, though, is the concentration of support among the firms that need it the 
least. The concentration of property, income, and sales tax reductions (among other benefits) 
with the wealthiest firms isolates them from competition in the marketplace. In this way, public 
monies benefit the highest ranking employees and investors of the largest, wealthiest firms. The 
firm’s bottom line is supported without reciprocal investment in new, large scale projects that 
employ the jobless. This again widens the gap between high earners and low earners. 
Encouraging Rent-Seeking 
Even an ideal scenario, where a company makes huge capital investments and employs 
thousands of locals, can lead to greater income inequality through rent-seeking.  Rent-seeking is 
the process by which firms use their economic resources to procure benefits without making 
additional or reciprocal investments. Specifically, firms can make threats to leave, gaining more 
incentives and creating uncertainty for workers. 
By providing resources directly to the firm, the state signals that it is willing to reward 
investment and seek to prevent the loss of the investment.  Incentives thus signal that threats to 
leave will be rewarded.  In response to threat, the state may commit additional resources to 
maintain investment.  This reduces the state’s return on investment and further drains resources 
that can be used on inequality correcting programs. 
But, providing these funds also creates an ethos of looming exit that creates uncertainty 
for workers.  Workers may be less likely to collectively demand higher wages and benefits 
knowing their company can shop for and receive incentives to move elsewhere. If a business 
does move, and it does not bring its workers with it, workers in the state lose income.  If workers 
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are dependent on an industry that is particularly mobile, such as manufacturing, jobs are less 
permanent, often moving, and income is volatile from year to year. Those relying on regular 
wages will thus have a harder time accumulating wages to invest in other ventures such as the 
stock or bond market.  In all, firms may pay lower wages, and have the tacit approval of the state 
in doing so since the state has invested in the firm and is wary of it leaving. This again widens 
the gap between rich and poor. 
Each of these three mechanisms demonstrate how incentive spending translates into 
greater income disparity. I do no distinguish between the mechanisms with a formal test, instead 
focusing on establishing the relationship between incentives and inequality via market 
conditioning and the logic behind it.  Thus, I provide Hypothesis 1 below. 
• Hypothesis 1: The more a state spends on economic development incentives over time, 
the more unequal the distribution of income in the state, all else equal. 
 
It is important to note that each of the three mechanisms discussed above is intimately 
related to a particular type of incentive spending: locational spending.  Locational incentive 
spending is meant to attract and retain wealthy firms to the state. Also referred to as supply-side 
strategy, this approach is based on the idea that capital investment is often hampered by the high 
costs—from land, labor, and raw materials—associated with doing business.  As such, states 
provide resources to keep established businesses in the state, or to attract investment from 
established businesses located outside the state.  State use locational to entice firms to locate in a 
particular location, often luring them from an existing location and using the company’s 
established prestige to develop the reputation of the state (e.g., Milward and Newman 1983). 
Often, these firms then engage in rent-seeking by asking for additional incentives under the 
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threat of moving elsewhere.51 Large sums are distributed to few wealthy firms, both 
redistributing public resources upward and conditioning the market to make it more favorable for 
those businesses. 
Locational economic development contrasts to entrepreneurial economic development.  
Entrepreneurial development, also referred to as demand-side strategy, is an approach that 
provides resources to new firms and technologies in order to grow their economic impact and 
create jobs. This approach is based on the idea that economic problems stem from environments 
that are not receptive to new and innovative businesses. In the entrepreneurial approach, 
resources are provided to increase flexibility, risk-taking, and to lower barriers to innovation and 
are provided in small sums to small businesses (see also Jansa and Gray forthcoming). Thus, 
there is likely little effect on income inequality as resources are distributed widely and the 
market is not significantly altered.  Instead, the effect of incentive spending on inequality is 
likely driven by how much states spend on locational economic development.  This hypothesis is 
stated below. 
• Hypothesis 2: The more a state spends on locational economic development incentives 
over time, the more unequal the distribution of income in the state, all else equal. 
 
Data & Methods 
To test the hypotheses, I estimate three equations that model state-level income inequality 
as a function of incentive spending and a number of political, policy, economic, and 
demographic control variables. The models are time-series cross-sectional error correction 
models (ECM). An ECM stipulates that change in the dependent variable is predicted by 1) the 
																																								 																				
51 Numerous examples of this pop up every year.  Most recently, Nabisco decided to leave Chicago for Mexico after 
receiving millions in tax breaks.  Nike and Intel in Oregon have received billions in incentives after making threats 
to leave for greener pastures.  Notoriously, sports teams leverage the exclusivity and public prominence for millions 
in tax payer funding for stadiums. 
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lagged value of the dependent variable, 2) simultaneous change in the independent variable(s), 
and 3) the lagged value of the independent variable(s), also known as a long-run effect of the 
independent variable(s). The model is standard for time series applications in political science 
(DeBoef and Keele 2008) and the study of state-level income inequality (Kelly and Witko 2012; 
Hayes and Medina Vidal 2015; Young 2016). The model is formulated in Equation 1 below.  
(1) ∆ Income Inequalityit =  β Income Inequalityit-1 + β ∆Incentive Spendingit +  β Incentive 
Spendingit-1 + control variables + e 
 
Inequality is measured in two different ways.  The first is market inequality, introduced 
above and depicted in Figure 5. Using the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement (ASES) data on household income by source,52 Kelly and Witko (2012) calculate a 
Gini coefficient for each state for each year that captures how unequal the distribution of income 
is prior to government redistribution. This measure ranges from 0 to 1 and is ideal for measuring 
market conditioning.  
The second measure of income inequality is post-transfer inequality. This measure is a 
Gini coefficient for each state for each year on all household income, including from public 
programs such as social security, unemployment, or workers’ compensation.  This measure is 
also produced and provided by Kelly and Witko (2012). This measure is used to test what effect 
incentives have on inequality when taking government redistribution into account, providing a 
harder test of the hypotheses as well as a robustness check on the models’ predictive power with 
different measures of inequality. 
Two key independent variables are used.  The first is incentive spending, which is 
measured as the total spent on incentives awarded to corporations.  Measurement is taken for 
																																								 																				
52 The U.S. Census Bureau, since 2006, has stopped collecting this detailed data.  Thus, the Kelly and Witko (2012) 
measure cannot be updated to the present for the time being. 
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each state for each year on a per capita basis. Dollar values are also adjusted for inflation to 2006 
dollars, the latest year in the dataset. This measure is used to test Hypothesis 1. The second is 
locational spending.  Locational spending is the measured as the total spent on “megadeal” 
incentive packages worth over $50 million.53  Studies have shown that these large packages are 
the thrust of state efforts to recruit and retain employers to the state (Milward and Newman 1983; 
Hanson 1993; Jansa and Gray forthcoming). The purpose of spending on these large packages is 
to influence the location decisions of large firms, rather than grow businesses. Like incentive 
spending, locational spending is measured for each state for each year, per capita, and adjusted 
for inflation. This measure is used to test Hypotheses 2. Each measure is converted to thousands 
of dollars to be able to display coefficient estimates in Table 3. Please see Appendix H for 
descriptive statistics on each of the spending measures. 
Data on incentive spending is provided by the Good Jobs First Subsidy Tracker (2015). 
Good Jobs First is a non-profit, non-partisan organization that gathers all publicly available data 
on incentives across the states. There are over 150,000 observations in the dataset; each 
observation is a specific award made by a state to a corporation.54 Incentive awards range in size 
from a single dollar to over $8 billion. This data was aggregated by state and year to produce the 
data used for the key independent variables. A number of different incentives are included in the 
																																								 																				
53 $50 million is taken as the threshold because the Good Jobs First data designates these as megadeals awarded to 
big firms to influence their location decisions. The threshold provides a hard test for the theory because we are only 
looking at the most valuable packages awarded by states, potentially excluding other, smaller locational packages.  
  
54 Good Jobs First, like any organization or scholar studying incentives, is hamstrung by the fact that states have 
discretion on reporting incentives.  Some states regard incentive awards as proprietary information and do not make 
the data readily available while others are fairly transparent. Jansa and Gray (forthcoming) argue that potentially 
missing data (i.e. states underreporting incentive spending publicly) makes any test of the effects or predictors of 
state incentive spending a scientifically difficult test. The Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) 
recently recommended that the fifty states adopt tax incentive full reporting requirements.  Hopefully, data will 
become more transparent going forward for additional tests of these, and related, hypotheses. 
 
  
 97 
dataset, including tax credits and rebates, property tax abatements, grant and low cost loans, 
enterprise zones, tax increment financing, job training and general cost reimbursements, bonds, 
cash, and infrastructure assistance, and “megadeals” that are packages of incentives valued at 
over $50 million.55  Megadeals are taken basis of the locational spending measure, while all 
incentives are used for the incentive spending measure.  
A number of other policy, politics, economic conditions, and demographic variables are 
included in the models.  A full account of each variable, how it is measured, the source of the 
data, and associated descriptive statistics is available in Appendix H, Table A4.  I provide a brief 
discussion here. On policy, the models control for the state’s corporate income tax rate, 
minimum wage, prevailing wage, right to work, unemployment compensation per capita, and 
welfare cash assistance per capita.  Each of these policies can 1) impact inequality and 2) are also 
used to attract corporate investment.56  
Also included as controls are a number of economic conditions that likely impact state-
level inequality. These are unemployment rate, union membership, gross state product (GSP), 
and the percentage of GSP from manufacturing. Each of these have been shown in previous 
studies to be important determinants of market and post-transfer inequality (Kelly and Witko 
2012). As the unemployment rate, manufacturing, and GSP increase, so too should inequality as 
larger, developed economies with high joblessness tend to have higher income inequality.  
Conversely, as union membership goes up and workers bargain for higher wages, income 
inequality should decrease. 
																																								 																				
55 See Jansa and Gray (forthcoming) for a deeper discussion of the types of incentives and their use across the states. 
 
56 By keeping wages or corporate tax rates low, or making it harder to unionize, states may not have to spend as 
much on incentives but may still yet be conditioning their markets in a business-friendly manner. 
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Also included as a control is government ideology. This is measured using Berry et al. 
(1998) government ideology scores, updated through 2006. Consistent with Kelly and Witko 
(2012), it is likely that inequality decreases as governments become more liberal. Finally, a 
number of demographic controls are included.  These are a state’s total population (in millions), 
the proportion of the state population that is non-white, and the proportion of the state population 
that is over 65 years old.  These are important controls used in other inequality studies (e.g., 
Kelly and Witko 2012) because these demographics tend to earn less than white citizens and 
younger citizens.  
The data is clustered by state and spans the years 1984 to 2006.  Hawaii and Wyoming 
are excluded for lack of data on incentive spending; Nebraska is excluded for lack of government 
ideology scores.  Many of the policy variables are “sluggish”, not changing much from year to 
year. Thus, clustering is accounted for by using state random effects. This accounts for the 
clustered nature of the data without controlling away slow-changing policy effects with fixed 
effects by state.  
Results & Discussion 
The model estimation results are presented in Table 3.  This table includes three models.  
Models 1 and 3 use change in market inequality as the dependent variable.  Model 2 uses post-
transfer inequality. Models 1 and 2 use total incentive spending as the key independent variable.  
Model 3 uses locational spending only. All models include the control variables discussed above.  
The results for these variables are included in Appendix I, Table A5 for space considerations. In 
all, the statistical evidence confirms both hypotheses.  
In both Model 1 and Model 2, the long-run coefficient for incentive spending is estimated 
to be positive and significant.  That is, controlling for the other variables in the model, increases 
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in per capita incentive spending at time t-1 leads to increased inequality at time t. This 
relationship is true of both market inequality (Model 1) and post-transfer inequality (Model 2).  
The coefficient estimates for incentive spending in Models 1 and 2 are significant at the p<.05 
level.  
Table 3: The Effect of Economic Development Incentives on Market Income Inequality, 
1984-2006 
 Model 1: 
ΔMarket 
Inequality 
(1984-2006) 
Model 2: 
ΔPost-Transfer 
Inequality 
(1984-2006) 
Model 3: 
ΔMarket 
Inequality 
(1984-2006) 
Market Inequality t-1 -.2982***     
(.0233) 
 
-.3443*** 
(.0249) 
-.2964*** 
(.0232) 
ΔIncentive Spending -.0015  
(.0078) 
 
-.0012 
(.0072) 
 
 
Incentive Spending t-1 .0058*  
(.0029) 
 
.0061* 
 (.0027) 
 
ΔLocational Spending   -.0077  
(.0094) 
 
Locational Spending t-1   .0083†  
(.0042) 
R2 0.19 0.20 0.19 
N 1,056 1,056 1,056 
Note: Table reports OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.  Both models estimated with 
random effects. Control variables are included in each model, but not shown here for space. See Appendix I for 
these results. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; †p < .1. 
 
The magnitude of the estimated effect is similar in each model; a one-unit increase in per 
capita incentive spending should lead to, on average, a .0058 increase in market inequality and a 
.0061 increase in post-transfer inequality.  Recall that a one-unit increase corresponds to $1,000 
in per capita spending.  Thus, over the course of the entire distribution of the variable, there is, 
on average, an increase of .011 in a state’s market inequality Gini coefficient and a .012 increase 
in a state’s post-transfer inequality Gini coefficient. This is a relatively modest effect, but it does 
translate to real differences in terms of the share of income among different groups within a 
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state.  The average Gini coefficient across the states for the time period studied is .489. This 
roughly translates to the top 10% of households earning 38% of the income.  The remaining 62% 
of income would be distributed to the bottom 90% of households. A change in the Gini 
coefficient of .0058 corresponds to increasing the share of income for top households to 40%.  
Similarly, decreasing the Gini coefficient decreases the share of income for top earners to 36%.  
Thus, the difference between states with little to no incentive spending and states with a lot of 
incentive spending is about 4% more of the economic pie taken by the wealthiest citizens.57  
The significant result for the long-run coefficient is strong evidence in support of 
Hypothesis 1. Higher incentive spending is estimated to lead to increased income inequality, 
robust to how inequality is measured and controlling for other critical variables. The short-run 
coefficient, however, is not statistically significant, nor is it positive. There is no statistically 
distinguishable relationship between changes in market and post-transfer inequality and changes 
in incentive spending in the same year. The lack of findings on short-run coefficients is typical 
for the study of state-level income inequality for a number of policy indicators (e.g. Kelly and 
Witko 2012; Hayes and Medina Vidal 2015) because of the complexity of state economies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
57 In terms of actual income, a state with an average level income at the 90th percentile—$109,961—would see a 
roughly $4,396 in more income in states with high incentive spending.    
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Figure 7: Incentive Spending and Its Long-term Effect on Inequality 
(a) All Incentive Spending 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Locational Spending Only 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The distributed effects of all incentive spending (a) and locational spending (b). The effects plotted 
here were generated by increases in the independent variable equal to the range of the entire variable. Therefore, this 
is the maximum effect if a state were to move spending from the minimum to the maximum. 
 
While the effect of incentives is modest and deploys over the long-term, it is also very 
long-lasting. Using a method for calculating the distributed effect of time-series variables 
developed by Banda and Windett (forthcoming), built on logic by DeBoef and Keele (2008), the 
inequality increasing effects of incentive spending felt for many years after incentives are 
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awarded.58 The distributed effects are depicted in Figure 7.  In Year 1, an increase in incentive 
spending produces a negative, statistically negligible effect on income inequality.  In Year 2, as 
subsidized firms distribute the benefits of incentives to those who are already well off, there is a 
spike in the Gini coefficient of .011.  This effect remains in years to follow, waning slowly.  
Only six years out does the positive, long-run effect mirror the negative, instantaneous effect in 
magnitude. 
Model 3 tests the effect of locational spending. Model 3 shows that there is a strong 
effect for locational spending on income inequality. The coefficients are similarly signed as the 
coefficients on incentive spending in Model 1; a negative initial effect and positive long-run 
effect.  Like total spending, the simultaneous effect is not distinguishable from zero, but the 
long-run effect is statistically significant at the p<.1 level.59 The size of the coefficients are larger 
for locational spending; a one-unit ($1000) change in spending is equal to an increase in the 
market inequality Gini of .0083. Over the span of the variable, this is an increase of .0166 in the 
market Gini coefficient.  This is still a modest effect on inequality, though less so than total 
incentive spending.  Performing the same calculation, top earners would take home 6% more of 
the income pie, or about $6,500 in real income, in states with high incentive spending versus 
states with low incentive spending. 
Again, these effects are distributed over the long-term.  These distributed effects are also 
depicted in Figure 7.  It is important to note that the scale of the Y axes in Figure 7 (a) and 
																																								 																				
58 The effect for year 1 is calculated as dif.x*qi, where dif.x is the coefficient on the change in incentive Spending 
and qi is 1.8456, which is the difference between the maximum and minimum value of the incentive spending 
variable. The second year is (lag.x-dif.x)*qi+((1-abs(lag.y))*a, where lag.x is the coefficient for lagged incentive 
spending, lag.y is the coefficient for lagged market inequality and a is the value of the year 1 equation.  All years 
going forward are calculated as (1-abs(lag.y))*b, where b is the value of the previous year equation. 
 
59 It is likely that it does not achieve the same significance level because of fewer instances of locational spending 
than locational and entrepreneurial spending combined. 
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Figure 7 (b) are the same.  Thus, locational spending has a larger long-term effect on increasing 
inequality than incentive spending all together.  The total incentive spending effect is dampened 
by the inclusion of smaller awards for entrepreneurial development purposes. Higher inequality 
is being driven by states that spend billions of dollars to attract the largest, wealthiest firms.  The 
market is conditioned to create a friendly climate for these companies, and the benefits of 
incentives are reaped by the well-off rather than lower earners. 
A number of control variables were estimated to be statistically significant predictors of 
change in income inequality.  In all three models, simultaneous changes in government ideology, 
the elderly population, and total population are negatively associated with changes in inequality.  
That is, as government switches from relatively more conservative to relatively more liberal, as 
the population gets older, and the population gets bigger, the less unequal the distribution of 
market incomes becomes.  The opposite is true for the non-white population and manufacturing 
GSP; increases in the non-white population are associate with higher inequality. For the long-run 
coefficients, unemployment, elderly population, non-white population, GSP, and manufacturing 
GSP are estimated to lead to increases in inequality that are statistically significant.   
Similarly, higher value minimum wages are associated with increased inequality in the 
long-run. While a counter-intuitive result, it is possible that states that have higher inequality to 
begin with are likely to raise the minimum wage to raise incomes at the lower end of the scale. 
As inequality grows over the time period, minimum wage is associated with increases in 
inequality. Having a prevailing wage law leads to decreases in the level of inequality over the 
long-run. States that have the prevailing wage are predicted to have Gini coefficients about .0024 
points lower than the states without prevailing wage laws, on average. This is a much larger 
effect in reducing inequality than incentive spending increases inequality. A one-percent increase 
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in union membership is predicted to lead to a .0005 to .0006 reduction in the Gini coefficient.  
That means that an increase in union membership from the minimum to the maximum is 
predicted to lead to a .012 decrease in inequality, an effect on par with per capita total incentive 
spending.60 
The coefficient estimates for corporate income tax rate, right to work, and welfare and 
unemployment spending were not distinguishable from zero in most cases. This is interesting 
because these policies have been the focus of extant studies of state-level income inequality (e.g., 
Hayes and Medina Vidal 2015; Hatch and Rigby 2015).  When incentives—a central policy 
focus for states—are considered, these policies seem to matter less. 
In all, the model results 1) establish a key relationship between incentive spending and 
income inequality and 2) establish that locational spending, which predominately benefits the 
largest, wealthiest corporations, drives this effect. It is important to note, though, that the 
estimated effect of incentives on increasing inequality is small compared to the effect of the 
prevailing wage and is on par with the effect of unionization rates. These labor market policies 
that empower workers to earn more and demand more from their employers have a large market 
conditioning effect that works against the effect of incentives. At its maximum, incentives are an 
inequality aggravator, making unequal distributions of income worse by conditioning markets in 
favor of capital. The exacerbating effect is long-lasting, existing for years after the incentives are 
awarded. This finding holds when controlling for a number of possible confounders. 
 
 
																																								 																				
60 The R2 for the models range between 0.18 and 0.20. While seemingly low given the number of predictors, these 
model fit statistics are on par with other studies in this line of research (see Kelly and Witko 2012). The models used 
in similar studies vary in whether they employ fixed or random effects; the random effects used here produces lower 
R2 compared to fixed effect models. 
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Concluding Thoughts  
States provide billions each year to firms in an effort to attract investment.  But in doing 
so, they subsidize what firms would do anyway, create insecurity for workers, and dedicate 
scarce public resources to help those who need the help the least. As a result, income inequality 
is exacerbated in the long-run for a long time.  
This is a critically important finding as legislators and governors may be inadvertently 
sowing the seeds of increased inequality despite intending to create broad-based economic 
growth. Locational incentive in particular direct vital public resources away from broad goods 
and toward payments for relatively wealthy firms, investors, and skilled employees.  Genuinely 
new jobs are often not created; little of the billions go to helping the jobless or those at the 
bottom of the income scale. 
This is a critical area of policy that warrants further study by scholars who are serious 
about understanding the political roots of income inequality. Scholars have focused on the 
redistributive and market conditioning effects of redistributive policies.  Less attention has been 
paid to the market conditioning effects of distributive and developmental policies, particularly 
the economic development efforts of state governments. But given incentives are a central focus 
of state governments, and states experiment by spending varying amounts on incentives in 
locational and entrepreneurial efforts, it makes sense that economic development is a cause of 
difference across the states in income inequality.   
Future research should look at what has happened since the Great Recession. From 2007 
to 2015, states increased the amount spent on incentives by an incredible amount (see Appendix 
J, Figure A5).  States collectively added, on average, $13 billion subsidies to private corporations 
each year from 2007-2014. Such a study would be an endeavor, but an important one. The Great 
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Recession provided increased urgency for states to create jobs, and they turned to incentives to 
do so (Jansa and Gray forthcoming). The recession and resulting recovery has lead to even 
greater income inequality, as most of the recovery gains have gone to the top 1% of earners. The 
accelerated use of economic development incentives, which direct public funds toward firms that 
are already relatively well-off, may be further exacerbating inequality. 
In the minds of policymakers, incentives are part of an overall business-friendly agenda 
to remain competitive for private investment. Take Republican Governor Scott Walker of 
Wisconsin for example. Walker touted right to work legislation as another tool in the state’s 
economic development repertoire, arguing the capital-friendly incentives and labor policies are 
critical to attracting investment (Calamur 2015).  This formulation of wedding locational 
incentives and pro-business labor regulations could greatly exacerbate inequality, according to 
the models presented here. States may consider putting more money into entrepreneurial efforts, 
as this is estimated to have little effect on inequality. While state legislators intend to condition 
their markets in a business-friendly manner, how they do so through locational subsidization 
does not create greater prosperity. Instead, it creates greater disparity.  
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CONCLUSION:  THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SCHOLARSHIP 
AND PRACTICE 
 
A number of answers about the American political economy are provided by delving into 
the use of economic development incentives at the state-level.  Firms and business associations 
are able to leverage their instrumental power to 1) take advantage of institutional facets and 
increase incentive spending and keep oversight low, 2) engage in long-term economic planning 
to orient the states to compete for desired industries, and 3) condition state markets to make them 
friendlier for business, which has the effect of increasing income inequality. These finding help 
clarify and sharpen the interstate competition paradigm.  Competition between the states is 
encouraged and shaped by client groups and captured agencies to the benefit of those who are 
already well-off.   
Yet, there are a number of questions that remain. First, it is unclear to what degree a pro-
incentive bias exists in agencies and legislatures prior to contact with client groups. As discussed 
in Chapter 1, an elected legislature that is pro-incentive is not evidence that that legislature is 
captured by client groups. It is also unclear to what degree the bureaucracy is made up of 
individuals who are already pro-business and pro-incentive. Mission-bias and barriers for 
competing groups certainly increase responsiveness to client groups, and such responsiveness 
manifests itself in a number of practices of the bureaucracy. This is corroborated by quantitative 
evidence (Jansa and Gray forthcoming), yet the mechanism of influence can still be sharpened. 
Scholars can use surveys of state legislators and economic development officials to quantify 
each’s positions on incentives and their reliance on input from client groups. 
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One of the major contributions is the use of spending data to analyze how states compete 
and the consequences of competition. The tests of Chapter 2 and 3 are based on spending data 
collected by Good Jobs First.  This database is the most comprehensive on subsidy spending at 
the state-level in existence. Yet, while the large package (over $50 million) data is complete, 
smaller award data are dependent on the transparency of each state.  Data used in extant studies 
are programmatic, providing the different incentive programs in each state but not the awards. 
Since many of the awards are made “off-budget” through tax abatement, using state budget data 
for each program misses much of the spending. Luckily, in 2015, the Government Accounting 
Standards Board (GASB) suggested new accounting and transparency standards for “off-budget” 
incentive spending.  It is widely expected that state governments will adopt this uniform policy. 
Such transparency will allow scholars to better understand which firms are benefitting, whether 
programs are achieving their goals, and political roots of subsidization and inequality. An 
interesting extension using new data would be to look at spending from the recipient firm’s 
standpoint: how beneficial are these policies to their bottom line?  
Which other states serve as competition can be further studied with other data sources, 
including program data and labor policies like right to work and minimum wage. The broader 
diffusion literature will be well-served by moving away from geography as a construct for the 
mechanisms of diffusion.  Policy diffusion via learning has moved away from such an 
operationalization, this dissertation moves economic competition away from geography, but the 
non-geographic dimensions of diffusion via imitation remain unclear. 
Extending inequality measures to the present day is needed to fully understand the role of 
state governments in shaping inequality. This would help extend the current analysis, but would 
also provide a service to the state politics scholarly community as a whole. Such an extension 
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would cover the Great Recession period, when states dramatically increased their use of 
incentives. By using incentives to combat the Great Recession’s effects on employment, states 
likely conditioned their markets to increase inequality.  Part I of the project could develop and 
extend measures of market inequality to the present day.  New measures extended to the present 
day would itself be a great service to the academic study of state politics and policy. Part II could 
examine how incentives and other policies have affected inequality, looking for greater effects in 
the Great Recession compared to the time period studied here. Part III could change the focus 
from states to firms: how do firms use economic crises to leverage more incentives from 
government. Scholarship is scant on this important question of American political economy. 
Inadvertently, subsidization during the Great Recession likely transferred economic and political 
power to the largest, wealthiest firms.  
From the firm’s stand-point, political scientists do not have a clear answer on how and 
why firms use economic crises to their advantage.  It could be that increased risk to firms during 
crises (and the benefits provided to firms through subsidies) make the costs of exercising 
instrumental power bearable. A study of this question would help scholars understand a critically 
important question of American political economy. Generally, scholars should continue to focus 
on state economic development policy, for it is rife with important questions for students, 
scholars, and policymakers on the distribution of funds in society, the influence of interest 
groups over that distribution, and how this process shapes the ability of government to create 
prosperity for its citizens.   
Reforming Incentives      
I want to be clear that the insular process and unequal effects of incentives do not suggest 
that incentives should not be used. As one economic development official noted, incentives 
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allows the community to use its collective resources to direct its economic future. Incentives can 
encourage investment that is beneficial community-wide, providing for the economic well-being 
of the citizenry. Community-based economic self-determination is a powerful argument in favor 
of incentives, even if it means that in practice public funds are used to support private venture. 
Rather than eliminating incentives, the incentive policy process should be modernized to 
remedy the outsized influence of firms seeking incentives.  To diversify input, states should 
consider instituting public comment periods on all proposed incentive awards.  These would 
operate similar to proposed regulations at the federal level.  Most incentives would proceed 
unimpeded, but still allow the opportunity for the public to weigh-in on how tax breaks are being 
distributed.  Similarly, the creation of a devil’s advocate position in economic development 
agencies, whose job it is to advocate against negotiated deals, would help give voice to concerns 
not currently considered. Such reforms have also been proposed to limit the influence of Wall 
Street firms at the Security and Exchange Commission (e.g., Kwak 2014). Perhaps the most 
significant change would be to reconstitute economic development agencies to eliminate the 
conflict of interest inherent in their mission, instead orienting them toward a tax-payer protection 
role.    
Still, states face information asymmetry vis-à-vis firms as they are unable to verify 
threats or fully estimate the impact of subsidizing projects. Reform proposals like an E-bay 
bidding system would open the awarding process to public scrutiny and reduce the potency of 
unverifiable threats. It is also reasonable for states to not grant the privileges afforded by NDAs, 
given firms are seeking public support. NDAs treat incentive packages as business deals where 
most of the leverage is on the side of the firm, but incentive packages are not business deals but 
public policy with huge implications for the distribution of resources in society.   
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In the end, it may be on the states to coordinate reforms. One politically possible 
interstate pact is to eliminate competition over extant jobs and capital. New projects can be open 
to competition among the states, but a firm would not be able use structural and instrumental 
power to leverage more incentives for an investment they have already made. By working 
together, the states may be able to allocate ideal amounts of funding to projects big and small 
without the threat of losing investment. With these reforms, states may be able to fulfill the 
promise of incentives to create new industries and jobs. Without, states will continue swapping 
jobs to detriment of the communities and individuals most in need of help. 
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APPENDIX A: PROCESS DIAGRAMS 
Figure A1: Interest Group Input in the Incentive Negotiation Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Blue arrows indicate information provided by competing groups.  Orange arrows indicate information 
provided by client groups.  Green indicates the flow of incentive funds. The informational arrows are weighted by 
the relative importance placed on it by state officials. The money arrows are weighted by the amount of spending. 
 
 
Figure A2: Interest Group Input in the Incentive Formulation Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Blue arrows indicate information provided by competing groups.  Orange arrows indicate information 
provided by client groups.  Green indicates the flow of incentive funds. Black indicates oversight. The informational 
arrows are weighted by the relative importance placed on it by state officials. The money arrows are weighted by the 
amount of spending. Notice that funds are lower and oversight is existent when competing groups are able to access 
the legislative process. 
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APPENDIX B: CASE SELECTION & RELEVANT VARIABLES 
 
 The power to make inferences in this study comes from the most different systems case-
selection method.  Many political and economic confounders are controlled for using this 
method. I find that in North Carolina and Oregon competing groups were able to access the 
legislature to limit spending and increase oversight.  In Nevada, however, client groups 
dominated the incentive negotiation and formulation process leading to major increases in 
incentive programs with little oversight.  Party control of legislature or governorship does not 
matter because Oregon and North Carolina were controlled by different parties over the time 
period (the Democratic and Republican party, respectively).  Each of the states was relatively 
high on unemployment compared to the national average.  Nevada and Oregon were highly 
unionized, but North Carolina was not, but Oregon and Nevada behaved much differently over 
the three-year period.  The same principle holds for type of awarding agency; Oregon and 
Nevada have independent executive agencies, while North Carolina charged the Department of 
Commerce and then EDPNC with incentive administration. Furthermore, North Carolina and 
Nevada focused on attracting out-of-state firms while Oregon focused on in-state firms.   
 
Table A1: State Economic and Political Conditions Since 2012 
State North Carolina Nevada Oregon 
Legislative Majority Republican (2012-
present) 
Democratic (2012-
2014) 
Republican (2015) 
Democratic (2012-
present) 
Governor Party Democratic (2012) 
Republican (2013-
present) 
Republican (2012-
present) 
Democratic (Kitzhaber 
2012-2015; Brown 
2015) 
Average 
Unemployment Rate 
(2012-2014) 
7.8% 9.5% 7.9% 
Average Private Sector 
Union Membership 
(2012-2014) 
2.6% 14.6% 15.4% 
Type of Awarding 
Agency 
Cabinet Department 
(2012-2014); Public-
Private Partnership 
(2015) 
Independent Agency Independent Agency 
In-State or Out-of-State 
Firms Receiving Large 
Incentive Packages 
Out-of-State Out-of-State In-State 
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APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW SCRIPTS 
 
Economic Development Official 
1. On individual incentive packages, how much room is there for negotiation?  Does the firm 
approach with a wish list that you more or less have to meet? Or do you base all offers on 
funding formula? 
2. What time constraints does your agency operate under to produce an incentives offer? 
3. What arguments and supporting information are being provided by firms seeking 
incentives?  What arguments/information do you make in return? 
4. How much independence does your agency have in spending decisions (who to award and 
how much) on industrial recruitment?  When would legislative approval be necessary?   
5. How and at what point in the process of a potential deal do you have contact with state 
legislators? 
6. How does your organization gather, produce, and analyze information on the impact of 
potential investments and incentive packages?  
7. Are there usually confidentiality issues at play, such as non-disclosure agreements or the 
firm’s use of location consultants?  Does this affect your ability to gather and analyze 
information on the impact of the investment/incentives? 
8. How often does your organization have contact with the governor’s office?  At what point 
in the process of a potential deal do you have contact with them? 
9. In your opinion, what are the pros and cons of incentives? 
10. What do you say to those who argue…? 
11. What changes, if any, would you like to see to the way the state handles economic 
development incentives? 
12. Is there anything I neglected to ask that you think I should know about this issue?  Perhaps 
developing/upcoming issues regarding incentives? 
13. Is there anyone you would recommend I also talk to about this issue? 
 
State Legislator 
1. How far in advance of [the special session or public announcement] did you become 
aware of the negotiated incentive package?  Were you being contacted by the firm/firm 
reps or the executive branch prior to [the special session or public announcement]? 
2. How much room was there for negotiation among you and your legislative colleagues?  
Was the bill more or less defined by the negotiations between the governor and the firm?  
How reflective is the package of funding formulas pre-set by the legislature? 
3. In general, what oversight does the legislature have over incentive awarding practices?  
Do non-disclosure agreements hinder oversight? 
4. What information on the issue of incentives did/do you seek when making policy 
decision?  From where do you obtain this information? 
5. Generally, how many contacts do you have with representatives from firms or business 
associations on the issue?  How does this compare to representatives from other 
organizations such as tax-payer, consumer advocates, or labor unions?  Did this differ in 
the special session? 
6. What are the pros and cons of incentives? Of all the arguments made, which are 
particularly compelling to you?  
7. What do you say to those who argue…? 
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8. What changes, if any, would you like to see to the way the state handles economic 
development incentives? 
9. Is there anything I neglected to ask that you think I should know about this issue?   
10. Is there anyone you would recommend I also talk to about this issue? 
Business Lobbyist (includes lobbyists for individual firms and business associations) 
1. What arguments do you make to government decision makers on the issue of incentives?  
Are these the typical arguments just tailored for the specific case?  Do they vary by branch 
of government or level of government? 
2. What information on your firm’s potential investment do you provide to support your 
arguments? What information on the firm’s need for incentives to complete an investment 
do you provide? 
3. How does the “interstate competition” environment shape the arguments you make? What 
time constraints are you under to secure a commitment from the state?  
4. On individual incentive packages, how much room is there for negotiation?  Does your 
firm approach with a wish list that the government more or less has to meet? To what 
degree is the scope of the deal bound by funding formula? 
5. Are non-disclosure agreements typical for firms seeking incentives?  
6. Approximately how many contacts did you have with legislators regarding this subsidy 
package prior to [the special session or public announcement]? 
7. How important are incentives to the state’s business climate?  Roughly what percentage of 
time do you spend lobbying the legislature on regulations? How about tax policy, 
including incentives or reductions in your tax rate? How about workforce development, 
infrastructure, or other general state economic issues that may affect multiple firms? 
8. What is your sense of the pros and cons of incentives?  What do you say to those who 
argue that incentives…?  
9. What changes, if any, would you like to see to the way the state handles economic 
development incentives? 
10. Is there anything I neglected to ask that you think I should know about this issue?  Perhaps 
developing/upcoming issues regarding incentives? 
11. Is there anyone you would recommend I also talk to about this issue? 
Competing Group Lobbyists (includes lobbyists from progressive, libertarian, tax-payer, 
community, and labor organizations) 
1. What arguments did/do you make to decision makers on the issue of incentives? What 
information do you provide to support these arguments? 
2. How does the “interstate competition” environment shape the arguments you are able to 
make?  Does the need for the state to move quickly or potentially lose an investment 
opportunity shape the access you are granted to decision makers? 
3. Do/did you hear information on potential incentive packages prior to press 
coverage/public announcement? Do confidentiality issues limit the amount of information 
on potential packages? 
4. On the issue of incentives, are you generally seeking greater access to legislators or do 
they seek you out for information?  At what points in the legislative process are you 
sought out? 
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5. What is your access to the governor’s office on the issue and what information do you 
provide?  How about economic development officials in the executive branch, especially 
those who help negotiate individual incentive packages? 
6. What is your sense of the pros and cons of incentives? 
a. What do you say to those who argue that incentives are…?  
7. What reforms would you like to see to the way the state handles economic development 
incentives? 
8. Is there anything I neglected to ask that you think I should know about this issue?  Perhaps 
developing/upcoming issues regarding incentives? 
9. Is there anyone you would recommend I also talk to about this issue? 
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APPENDIX D: INTERVIEW SUBJECT TABLE 
 
Table A2: Summary of Interview Subjects 
ID 
Number 
Subject State Date Medium Length 
(minutes) 
Sample 
1 EDV North Carolina 2/23/2015 In Person 60 Purposive 
2 COM North Carolina 4/3/2015 In Person 60 Purposive 
3 BUS Nevada 5/26/2015 In Person 45 Purposive 
4 BUS Nevada 5/26/2015 In Person 35 Purposive 
5 LEG Nevada 5/26/2015 In Person 15 Referral 
6 LEG Nevada 5/26/2015 In Person 30 Purposive 
7 LEG Nevada 5/27/2015 In Person 25 Purposive 
8 EDV Nevada 5/27/2015 In Person 55 Purposive 
9 EDV Nevada 5/27/2015 In Person 65 Referral 
10 EDV Nevada 5/27/2015 In Person 30 Referral 
11 COM Nevada 5/28/2015 In Person 70 Purposive 
12 EDV Oregon 6/1/2015 In Person 35 Purposive 
13 COM Oregon 6/1/2015 In Person 30 Purposive 
14 LEG Oregon 6/1/2015 In Person 50 Purposive 
15 LEG Oregon 6/1/2015 In Person 50 Referral 
16 BUS Oregon 6/2/2015 In Person 40 Referral 
17 BUS Oregon 6/2/2015 In Person 45 Purposive 
18 LEG Oregon 6/2/2015 In Person 20 Purposive 
19 LEG Oregon 6/2/2015 In Person 40 Purposive 
20 COM Oregon 6/3/2015 In Person 30 Purposive 
21 EDV Oregon 6/3/2015 In Person 65 Purposive 
22 LEG Oregon 6/3/2015 In Person 15 Purposive 
23 BUS Oregon 6/4/2015 In Person 35 Purposive 
24 EDV Oregon 6/9/2015 Phone 40 Referral 
25 EDV Oregon 6/9/2015 Phone 25 Referral 
26 LEG Oregon 6/2/2015 In Person 15 Referral 
27 EDV North Carolina 6/23/2015 In Person 40 Purposive 
28 EDV North Carolina 7/1/2015 In Person 50 Referral 
29 COM North Carolina 7/2/2015 In Person 45 Purposive 
30 LEG North Carolina 7/14/2015 Phone 20 Purposive 
31 EDV North Carolina 7/14/2015 In Person 30 Purposive 
32 LEG North Carolina 7/16/2015 In Person 45 Purposive 
33 EDV Nevada 5/15/2015 Phone 15 Purposive 
Subject Key: COM = Competing Group Lobbyist; BUS = Business Lobbyist; EDV = Economic 
Development Official; LEG = State Legislator 
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APPENDIX E: TOP TEN LOCATION FACTORS FOR BUSINESSES 
 
Table A3: Top Business Location Factors 
 
2013 Rank Factor 
1 Skilled Labor 
2 Highway Accessibility 
3 Labor Costs 
4 Construction Costs 
5 Telecommunications Availability 
6 Building availability 
7 Corporate Income Tax Rate 
8 State and Local Incentives 
9 Low Unionization 
10 Energy Costs 
 
Note: Sourced from Area Development Annual Corporate Survey, 2013. Incentives ranked as 
high as 4th in previous years of the survey, as low as 13th. 
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APPENDIX F: INDUSTRY DEFINITIONS AND INCENTIVE PACKAGES 
Figure A3: Number of Incentive Packages & States by Industry, 1984-2014 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Note: Calculated by author using data from Good Jobs First Subsidy Tracker 
From 1984 to 2014, there were 120 deals made with heavy manufacturing companies. 
Incentive packages to heavy manufacturers encourage the establishment or expansion of 
production and/or assembly plants of large and complex goods. The next most subsidized 
industry was corporate headquarters, with 59 deals since 1988. While not an industry in the 
traditional sense, the use of incentives to retain or attract the headquarters of top retail, finance, 
and insurance firms was a clear cleavage in the data. With 50 deals since 1990, Chemical, 
Energy, and Mining was the third most subsidized industry in the data set. Chemical and fossil 
fuel production and refinement, utilities, clean coal and renewable energy, and natural resource 
mining companies make up this industry category; each of the companies is involved in some 
aspect of using or improving natural and man-made resources. High-tech manufacturing, the 
fourth most subsidized industry with 30 deals, is comprised of companies that received 
incentives to establish, expand, or retain production and assembly plants for computers, 
computer parts, or batteries. These plants are distinguishable from heavy manufacturing in that 
they employ fewer workers and may require more technical knowledge as many of their 
employees are on-site engineers rather than assembly workers. Two related industry categories 
are Real Estate Development and Arts and Entertainment. There were 27 Real Estate 
Development deals and 11 Arts and Entertainment deals. Companies receiving subsidies in real 
estate development were generally charged with a task to manage the construction of commercial 
or housing projects that would generate future revenue and potentially attract tourists (such as 
Minnesota awarding incentives to Triple Five to offset costs of managing the renovation of Mall 
of America). Likewise, the purpose of arts and entertainment deals is to expand or retain 
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companies that export entertainment, such as NBC and ESPN, or improve the attraction of the 
state as an entertainment destination, such as through the subsidization of a new casino-hotel. 
The remaining industry categories are defined by the type of companies that comprise 
them. The Food Production deals subsidized companies engaged in establishing or expanding 
food production facilities. The 9 Health and Pharmaceutical deals supported hospitals and 
pharmaceutical research and production. The 12 Transportation packages attracted airline hubs 
and distribution centers. The 13 Information packages subsidized data farms, call centers, and 
technical headquarters for various companies. Finally, the 16 Research and Development deals 
helped support companies establishing or expanding facilities for scientific, technological, and 
medical research. There is clear overlap with the NAICS categories, however NAICS industries 
such as Agriculture were largely absent from the incentives data. Companies that would fall into 
the separate NAICS categories of Construction and Real Estate were combined into the Real 
Estate Development category because of the purpose of the incentive package. Finance and 
Business Service firms were often seeking new locations for their headquarters (as did many 
retail firms), making this a natural industry classification in the data if not in the NAICS. 
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APPENDIX G: VARIATION ACROSS THE STATES BY INDUSTRY-BASED 
COMPETITION 
Figure A4: Industry-based Competition Measure, 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Map shows the number of deals offered by other states in industries subsidized by the state.  For example, 
states competing with Illinois offered between 158-201 deals in the industries subsidized by Illinois.  The year of 
data depicted is 2014. 
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APPENDIX H: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR INEQUALITY ANALYSIS 
 
Table A4: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Definition Source Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Market  
Inequality 
Gini coefficient excluding 
income from public 
programs 
Kelly and 
Witko 
(2012) 
.4891 .0360 .3857 .5992 
Post-Transfer 
Inequality 
Gini coefficient including 
income from public 
programs 
Kelly and 
Witko 
(2012) 
.4222 .0311 .3443 .5107 
Incentive 
Spending 
Total spent on subsidies to 
corporations by state 
governments. Measured in 
thousands of dollars per 
capita. Inflation-adjusted to 
2006 dollars. 
Calculated 
using Good 
Jobs First 
data 
.0888 .2351 .0000 1.845 
Locational 
Spending 
Total spent on subsidy 
packages worth over $50 
million. Measured in 
thousands of dollars per 
capita. Inflation-adjusted to 
2006 dollars. 
Calculated 
using Good 
Jobs First 
data 
.0632 .1578 .0000 1.543 
Entrepreneurial 
Spending 
Total spent on subsidy 
packages worth under $50 
million. Measured in 
thousands of dollars per 
capita. Inflation-adjusted to 
2006 dollars. 
Calculated 
using Good 
Jobs First 
data 
.0256 .1033 .0000 .8547 
Corporate  
Tax Rate 
Top marginal tax rate 
applied to corporate income 
Book of the 
States 
7.043 3.688 0.000 10.00
0 
Minimum  
Wage 
Dollar value of the state’s 
minimum wage 
U.S. Dept. 
of Labor 
4.387 1.071 1.400 7.500 
Right to  
Work 
1 if the state has a right to 
work law, 0 if not 
NCSL .3903 .4881 .0000 1.000 
Prevailing  
Wage 
1 if the state requires 
employers to pay the 
prevailing wage, 0 if not 
U.S. Dept. 
of Labor 
.4764 .4997 .0000 1.000 
Welfare Cash 
Assistance 
Per capita direct payments 
to individuals through 
public welfare programs. 
Measured in thousands of 
dollars per capita. 
Hayes and 
Medina 
Vidal 
(2015) 
.0553 .4329 .0000 .2945 
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Unemployment 
Compensation 
Per capita direct payments 
to individuals through 
unemployment programs. 
Measured in thousands of 
dollars. 
Hayes and 
Medina 
Vidal 
(2015) 
.0893 .0601 .0082 .4677 
Government 
Ideology 
NOMINATE score 
averaged across state 
legislative chambers and 
governor and scaled from 0 
to 1. 
Berry et al 
(1998), 
updated 
through 
2006 
.5346 .2110 .0651 .8968 
Manufacturing 
GSP 
Proportion of the gross state 
product from the 
manufacturing sector 
U.S. Bureau 
of 
Economic 
Analysis 
.1835 .7909 .2103 .3893 
GSP Gross state product in 
trillions of dollars 
U.S. Bureau 
of 
Economic 
Analysis 
.1497 .1964 .0062 1.728 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Percentage of the population 
that is unemployed 
U.S. Bureau 
of Labor 
Statistics 
5.492 1.701 2.300 14.80 
Union 
Membership 
Percentage of the population 
that belongs to a labor 
union, public or private 
Hirsch and 
MacPherson 
(2003), 
updated 
through 
2006 
13.55 5.995 2.300 32.20 
Non-white 
population 
Proportion of the population 
that is a race or ethnicity 
other than White-Non-
Hispanic 
U.S. Census 
Bureau 
.2000 .1236 .0161 .5615 
Elderly 
population 
Proportion of the population 
that is above 65 years old 
U.S. Census 
Bureau 
.1249 .0203 .0299 .1855 
Total population Population of the state in 
millions of people 
U.S. Census 
Bureau 
5.472 5.823 .5137 36.00 
Note: Each variable is measured for each year and each state. Hawaii and Wyoming excluded for lack of incentive 
spending data. 
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APPENDIX I: RESULTS FOR CONTROL VARIABLES IN INEQUALITY ANALYSIS 
 
Table A5: Results for Control Variables Used in Models Presented in Table 3 
 
 Model 1: 
ΔMarket 
Inequality 
(1984-2006) 
Model 2: 
ΔPost-
Transfer 
Inequality 
(1984-2006) 
Model 3: 
ΔMarket 
Inequality 
(1984-2006) 
Model 4: 
ΔMarket 
Inequality 
(1984-2006) 
ΔCorp Inc.Tax 
Rate 
.0000 
(.0002) 
-.0001 
(.0002) 
.0000 
(.0002) 
-.0000 
(.0002)     
Corp Inc. Tax 
Rate t-1 
.0001 
(.0001) 
-.0000 
(.0001) 
.0000 
(.0001) 
.0000   
(.0002)      
ΔWelfare Cash 
Assist. 
-.0695 
(.0403)† 
-.0531 
(.0371) 
-.0673 
(.0402) 
-.0650 
(.0403) 
Welfare Cash 
Assist. t-1 
-.0097 
(.0160) 
-.0060 
(.0147) 
-.0095 
(.0160) 
-.0032 
(.0156) 
ΔUnemployment 
Comp. 
.0047 
(.0211) 
.0010 
(.0193) 
.0052 
(.0211) 
.0034 
(.0211) 
Unemployment 
Comp. t-1 
.0208 
(.0139) 
.0365 
(.0126)** 
.0218 
(.0139) 
.0198 
(.0139) 
ΔMin. Wage .0028 
(.0019) 
.0020 
(.0018) 
.0030 
(.0019) 
.0028 
(.0019) 
Min. Wage t-1 .0018 
(.0008)* 
.0021 
(.0007)** 
.0018 
(.0008)* 
.0019 
(.0008)* 
ΔPrev. Wage -.0009 
(.0076) 
-.0031 
(.0071) 
-.0008 
(.0076) 
-.0012 
(.0076) 
Prev. Wage t-1 -.0024 
(.0013)† 
-.0024 
(.0012)* 
-.0023 
(.0012)† 
-.0023 
(.0012)† 
ΔRight to Work .0033 
(.0076) 
.0033 
(.0069) 
.0034 
(.0076) 
.0034 
(.0076) 
Right to Work t-1 -.0001 
(.0016) 
-.0006 
(.0014) 
-.0001 
(.0016) 
-.0001 
(.0016) 
ΔGovt Ideology -.0149 
(.0055)** 
-.0168 
(.0050)*** 
-.0151 
(.0055)** 
-.0150 
(.0054)** 
Govt Ideology t-1 .0039 
(.0029) 
.0015 
(.0026) 
.0038 
(.0028) 
.0036 
(.0028) 
ΔUnemployment 
Rate 
.0012 
(.0009) 
-.0001 
(.0008) 
.0013 
(.0009) 
.0012 
(.0009) 
Unemployment 
Rate t-1 
.0027 
(.0005)*** 
.0008 
(.0004)* 
.0027 
(.0005)*** 
.0027 
(.0005)*** 
ΔUnion 
Membership 
-.0002 
(.0005) 
-.0004 
(.0004) 
-.0002 
(.0005) 
-.0002 
(.0005) 
Union 
Membership t-1 
-.0006 
(.0001)*** 
-.0005 
(.0001)*** 
-.0006 
(.0002)*** 
-.0005 
(.0001)*** 
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ΔManufacturing 
GSP 
.0813 
(.0387)* 
.0472 
(.0356) 
.0836 
(.0386)* 
.0806 
(.0385)* 
Manufacturing 
GSP t-1 
.0221 
(.0087)* 
.0137 
(.0079)† 
.0216 
(.0086)* 
.0216 
(.0087)* 
ΔGSP  -.0091 
(.0674) 
-.0057 
(.0621) 
-.0072 
(.0675) 
-.0141 
(.0673) 
GSP t-1 .0172 
(.0101)† 
.0207 
(.0093)* 
.0167 
(.0101)† 
.0165 
(.0101) 
ΔNon-white 
Population 
.5579 
(.2500)* 
.6525 
(.2296)** 
.5398 
(.2495)* 
.5268 
(.2484)* 
Non-white 
Population t-1 
.0198 
(.0072)** 
.0285 
(.0067)*** 
.0188 
(.0073)** 
.0228 
(.0071)*** 
ΔElder 
Population 
-1.611 
(.6318)** 
-1.759 
(.5731)** 
-1.602 
(.6313)** 
-1.579 
(.6319)* 
Elder Population 
t-1 
.2614 
(.0372)*** 
.1547 
(.0309)*** 
.2539 
(.0364)*** 
.2628 
(.0378)*** 
ΔTotal 
Population 
-.0261 
(.0093)** 
-.0315 
(.0086)*** 
-.0253 
(.0093)** 
-.0255 
(.0093)** 
Total Population 
t-1 
-.0001 
(.0003) 
-.0000 
(.0003) 
-.0001 
(.0003) 
-.0001 
(.0003) 
R2 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.19 
N 1,056 1,056 1,056 1,056 
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APPENDIX J: INCREASED INCENTIVE SPENDING DURING GREAT RECESSION 
 
Figure A5: Total Incentive Spending by State Governments, 1984-2015 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
 
Note: Calculated by the author using Good Jobs First Subsidy Tracker database. All spending totals are adjusted for 
inflation to 2015 dollars 
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